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Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: 
The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the 
Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgmentst 
AMY B. COHEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 12, 1989, the House of Representatives voted to cut the amount 
it had appropnated for 1990 for the National Endowment for the Arts 
("NEA").I The reduction was made In order to express' congressIOnal dis-
approval of two projects which the NEA had previously funded: the pho-
tography of Robert Mapplethorpe,. whose work was critIcIzed for its 
homoerotic and sexual content, and of Andres Serrano, whose photograph 
of a crucifIx submerged in urine was assailed.2 On July 26, 1989, Senator 
Jesse Helms of North Carolina proposed an amendment to the same appro-
priations bill, which provided in part that none of the appropnated funds 
could be used to support "obscene or indecent materials."3 ThIs amendment 
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1. 135 CONGo REc. H3635-55 (daily ed. July 12, 1989). 
2. Representative Rohrabacher had proposed a cut of all NEA fnnding based m part on 
his reactions to the Serrano and Mapplethorpe works .. ld. at H3637-38. His amendment was 
supported by Representative Dannemeyer of Califorrua who also cited the Serrano and Map-
plethorpe works as Justifications. ld. at H3640-41. Representative Williams of Montana opposed 
the amendment, citing many examples of works of art ongmally scorned but later appreciated. 
ld. at H3641. Although the Rohrabacher amendment to cut all funding was ultimately rejected, 
the House did eventually agree to an amendment which cut NEA funding by $45,000, the 
combmed amount of the grants which had supported the Mapplethorpe and Serrano proJects. 
ld. at H3653-55. 
3. 135 CONGo REc. S8806 (daily ed. July 26, 1989). The full text of the Helms amendment 
prOVided: 
None of the funds authonzed to be appropnated pursuant to this Act may be 
used to promote, dissemmate, or produce-
(1) obscene or mdecent matenals, mcluding but not limited to depictions 
of sadomasochism, homo-erotiClsm, the exploitation of children, or mdi-
Vlduals engaged m sex acts; or 
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was also a reaction to the Mapplethorpe and Serrano proJects, wluch Senator 
Helms described as "homoerotic pornography" and "blasphemy," respec-
tively 4 Although Senator Metzenbaum of Oluo expressed concern about 
congressIOnal Involvement In defimng art,S the Senate agreed to the amend-
ment.6 The bill was reported to the committee and, after much debate In 
both the House and the Senate, was eventually adopted with more limited 
language.' 
The Helms amendment controversy and the photographs of Robert Map-
plethorpe and Andres Serrano focused attention on two questions: what IS 
art, and should the government be Involved In that determInation? Many 
who opposed the Helms amendment expressed concern about any govern-
mental role determimng what IS "art."8 
Jd. 
(2) matenal wInch demgrates the objects or beliefs of the adherents of a 
particular religIOn or non-religIOn; or 
(3) matenal wInch demgrates, debases, or reviles a person, group, or 
class of citizens on the basiS of race, creed, sex, handicap, age, or national 
ongm. 
4. Jd. at S8807 (remarks of Sen. Helms). 
5. Jd. at S8808 (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum). 
6. Jd. at S8809. 
7. As adopted, the law prOVides m part: 
None of the funds authonzed to be appropnated for the National Endowment 
for the Arts or the National Endowment for the Humanities may be used to 
promote, disseffi1nate, or produce matenals wInch m the Judgment of the National 
Endowment for the Arts or the National Endowment for the Humanities may be 
considered obscene, meluding but not limited to, depictions of sadomasocInsm, 
homo-eroticlsm, the sexual exploitation of children, or mdiViduals engaged m sex 
acts and wInch, when taken as a whole, do not have senous literary, artisttc, 
political or SCientific value. 
Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304, 1989' U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 
(103 Stat.) 741 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 954). 
8. In Congress, for example, Senator Danforth opposed the amendment, questiomng, 
"[blow good are we at defimng whether sometInng IS suitable art or not suitable art and how 
do we draw those definitions?" 135 CONGo RIle. S12116 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1989). Senator 
Jeffords argued, m opposition to the Helms amendment: "We will be restncting the atmosphere 
m wInch the creative process occurs. We will be mJecting an element of fear mto the creative 
process, and adding an unprecedented and I believe an unconstitutional layer of censorsInp. 
We will be discouraging, not encouragmg, the promotion and creation of art." Jd. at S12131. 
Senators Cranston and Kerry were also vehement m theIr opposition to the Helms amendment. 
Senator Cranston worned that the amendment would "serve to move our country toward the 
kmd of system of state censorsInp and control of thought and expression that we have fought 
wars agaInst at great cost m blood and treasure." Jd. at S12132. Senator Kerry observed that 
the amendment "will have a chilling effect witInn the art world and raIse senous questions 
about standards wInch Congress should not be defimng and, m fact, IS ill eqwpped to define." 
Jd. 
In addition to these congressIOnal comments, many others expressed s1ffiilar concerns. E.g., 
Danto, Art and Taxpayers, NATION, Aug. 21128, 1989, at 192, 193 ("[I]ndiVidual members of 
Congress have revealed themselves as eneffi1es of freedom by letting 'theIr aesthetic attitudes 
corrupt their political mtegrity as custodians of the deepest values of a democratic society. "); 
Healy, Govemment-A Good Patron but Bad Censor, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1989, at A31, 
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The concern about the propriety of a governmental role In the definition 
of art, whIch has been played out so VIVIdly in the NEA funding controversy, 
has also been an Important factor In shaping the structure of American 
copynght law. While members of Congress have recently urged the NEA to 
take an active role In def'Ining art and makIng the value Judgments Inherent 
In that definition, Congress and the courts have rustoncally attempted to 
structure Amencan copynght law to avoId these very value Judgments.9 
In 1903, Justice Holmes cautioned agaInst courts making judgments about 
the merits of a given work In detennmmg whether or not that work should 
be given copynght protection,lo Justice Holmes observed that "[i]t would be 
a dangerous undertaking for persons traIned only to the law to constitute 
themselves f'Inal judges of the worth of pictonal illustrations, outsIde of the 
narrowest and most obvious limits."l1 These words and the VIew they express, 
so often relied upon and quoted by courtsl2 and commentators,13 have 
substantially Influenced the development of Amencan copynght law In the 
twentieth century. Consistent with this opimon, both the courts and Congress 
have attempted to shape copynght doctnne so that declSlons about the 
copynght protection provided to given works and declSlons about the In-
fnngement of the copynght in such works can be made without regard to 
anyone's assessment of the artistic value of the work.14 
col. 2 ("Government auns m its subsidy of the arts to enhance the qUality of life of the 
people Government cannot at one and the same time seek that good and then put it at 
nsk by however nghteously conceived a censorslup."); Hackney, The Helms Amendment Imperils 
the BasIS of Intellectual Freedom, Chron. Higher Educ., Sept. 6, 1989, at A48, col. 1 (criticIZes 
the Helms amendment as "government discnnunation agamst certain Ideas"); McGinms, Banning 
U.S. Aid for "Obscene" Art Is Sure to Stifle Freedom of expressIOn, Chron. Higher Educ., 
Aug. 9, 1989, at A36, col. 1 ("rr]he government should not directly or mdirectly keep any 
work from bemg produced or shown that doesn't phYSically harm or lead to the phYSical harm 
of the public. "); Farrel & BenaVidez, Let the Arts Be Unfettered by Politics of the Moment, 
L.A. Times, Aug. 7, 1989, § 2 (Metro), at 5, col. 1 (Helms amendment conSidered "the most 
senous and radical assault on freedom of expressIOn to occur m tlus country smce the days of 
Joe McCarthy and 'blacklists .... ). 
9. See mfra notes 17-54 and accompanymg text. 
10. BlelStem v. Donaldson Lithograplung Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (advertismg posters held 
eligible for copynght protection). 
11. Id. at 251. 
12. See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 439 (4th Cir. 1986); Carol 
Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1985); EsqUire, Inc. v. 
Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 80S (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Tennessee 
Fabncating Co. v. Moultne Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279,282 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 
(1970); Trifan. Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 134 F Supp. 551, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
13. See, e.g., Demcola, Applied Art and IndustTlal Design: A Suggested Approach to 
COPYTlght m Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REv. 707, 708 n.10, 712-14 (1983); Jones, Factual 
Compilations and the Second Circuit, 52 BROOKLYN L. REv 679, 695 (1986); Note, Works of 
Applied Art: An Expansion of COPYTlght Protection, 56 S. CAL. L. REv 241, 252 (1982) 
[heremafter "Note, Works"]; Note, Problems m Givrng Obscenity COPYTlght Protection: Did 
Jartech and Mitchell Brothers Go Too Far?, 36 VAND. L. REv. 403, 418 (1983) [heremafter 
"Note, Problems"]. 
14. See mfra notes 17-90 and accompanymg text. As used m tlus Article, the term "artistic 
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DetermmatIOns of eligibility for copyrIght protection are generally made 
without regard for the artistic value of the work. IS Judges have often relied 
on theIr assessment of the artistic value of the works at Issue, however, m 
reachmg decIsIons m cases of copyrIght mfrmgement. When a court needs 
to determme whether a second work mfnnges the copyrIght m the first work, 
the court must compare the works m order to determme the scope of 
copynght protection to be afforded the first work. The way Judges evaluate 
art mevitably affects thIS determmatIon; theIr VIews as to the artIstic value 
of the works before them has an effect on how far they will be willing to 
go to protect the first work by suppressmg the second work.16 
ThIs Article focuses on the problem of how artistic values affect deter-
mmatlons of copynght mfnngement. First, Part I shows that the copynght 
statutes embody a congreSSIOnal desIre to have determmations of eligibility 
for copynght made without regard for the artIStIC value of the work at issue. 
Part II explores the dangers that Justice Holmes and those who have followed 
hIs lead saw In usmg assessments of artIstic value to make copynght decIsIons. 
Part III discusses how assessments of artistic value mfluence copynght 
InfrIngement determInations, specifically through the application of the Idea-
expreSSIOn dichotomy, a pnncIple used to determme whether the copynght 
In a copynghted work has been mfnnged. Finally, the ConclUSIOn addresses 
the dilemma posed by the diSCUSSIon In the preceding parts: if copynght 
InfrIngement decIsIons necessarily rely on a Judgment as to the artiStIC value 
of the works at Issue, how do we address the dangers that worned JustIce 
Holmes? 
I. THE COPYRIGHT STATUTES AND CONGRESS' ATTEMPTS 
TO AVOID RELIANCE ON ARTISTIC VALUES 
As proclaImed m the ConstitutIon, the purpose of copynght law IS to 
"promote the Progress of SCIence and useful Arts, by secunng for limited 
Times to Authors the exclusIve RIght to theIr. WritIngs. "17 
The ultimate objective of such protectIOn IS to ensure the dissemmatlon of 
knowledge to the public; by provIding authors wIth protection agaInst copymg 
value" refers to the evaluation of a work of art on the basis of whatever factors are considered 
relevant to the particular judge or deCISion maker In assessing the value of a work of art, for 
example, the work's ability to produce a pleasurable aesthetic reaction, the creativity and skill 
that the judge perceives as necessary to create that work, the work's popular appeal and/or its 
reception In the fine arts or literary worlds and any other factors that are Significant to that 
judge. Thus, when it IS argued that a judge's view of the artistic value of a gIven work of art 
affects that judge's determination of the scope of copynght protection to be granted to that 
work, it IS thiS definition of "artiStic value" that IS Intended. 
15. See mfra notes 17-54 and accompanYIng text. 
16. See mfra notes 91-228 and accompanYIng text. 
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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for a period of time, Congress mtended to proVlde authors with the mcentive 
to create works. After that limited penod of protection, the public is ensured 
free access to those works. 18 
Since 1790, Congress has enacted statutes designed to accomplish tills 
obJective.19 In the twentieth century those statutes have revealed a congres-
SIonal desIre to provide copynght without regard for the artistic value of 
the work for willch protection IS sought. Tills desIre IS reflected in at least 
three aspects of the two pnnclpal copynght statutes of the twentieth century, 
the 1909 CopyrIght Act (the "1909 Act")20 and the Copynght ReVlslon Act 
of 1976 (the "1976 Act"):21 the liberal definition of works eligible for 
protection, the lack of any substantIve evaluatIon of the merits of the 
particular work seeking protection and the prOVISIon for statutory damages. 
A. The Liberal Defimtion oj Works Eligible 
jor Copyrzght Protection 
Congress' deSIre to grant copynght protection regardless of the artistic 
value of a particular work IS reflected m the very loose terms used m both 
the 1909 Act and the 1976 Act to define the type of works eligible for 
cOPYrIght protection. In the 1909 Act, Congress proVIded that "all the 
writings of an author" were eligible for copynght,22 a phrase lifted directly 
from the constitutional clause empowenng Congress to prOVIde copyright 
protection.23 No specific definition of "writing" or "author" was prOVIded 
m the Act, and although m sectIon five of the 1909 Act Congress listed 
several specific categones of copyrightable works, it explicitly indicated that 
these categones were not exclUSIve: "[t]he above specifications shall not be 
held to limit the subject matter of copynght as defined in section 4 of tills 
title,"24 that IS, as "all the writings of an author."25 By companng tills to 
18. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of· Am. v. Uruversal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) 
(Copynght "is Intended to motivate the creative activity of authors by the 'provlSJon of a 
special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their geruus after the limited 
penod of exclUSive control has exprred."); Twentieth Century MUSIC Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 
151, 156 (1975) ("Creative work IS to be encouraged and rewarded, but pnvate motivation must 
ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, mUSIC, and the 
other arts. [T]he ultimate rum IS, by tills Incentive, to stimulate artiStiC creativity for the 
general public good."); Hoehling v. Uruversal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.) 
("The copynght prOVides a finanCial Incentive to those who would add to the corpus of eXisting 
knowledge by creating ongInal works."), cert. demed, 449 U.S. 841 (1980). See generally 1 M. 
NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03, at 1-31 to 1-32 (1989). 
19. See mfra notes 35, 53, 110. 
20. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978) (formerly codified at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976». 
21. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988». 
22. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978). 
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
24. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978). 
25. Jd. at § 4. 
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the definition of patentability In the patent statute which requrres a shoWIng 
of novelty, utility and non-obviousness,26 or the specific reqwrements for 
trademark registration provIded In the Lanham Act, whlch denies eligibility 
to marks In part based on content,27 Congress' deSIre In 1909 not to Impose 
substantive limItations on the works eligible for copynght IS eVldent.28 
ThIS deSIre not to Impose substantIve limitations on copynght eligibility IS 
also revealed In the 1976 Act, where agaIn Congress Identified categones of 
works WhICh were eligible for copynght, but proVlded that thls list was not 
exclusIve.29 Although Congress changed the definition of copynghtable works 
from "all the writings of an author" to "ongInal works of authorshlp," 
the legIslative hIStOry clearly Indicates that the reqwrement that the work be 
"ongInal" IS only a mImmal reqwrement that the work submitted be the 
work of the person claimIng authorshlp and not copIed from another work. 30 
26. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (patent available to anyone who "invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, maclune, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
Improvement thereof "); 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) (patent derued if "the Invention was 
known or used by others In tlus country before the Invention thereof by the applicant for 
patent "); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) (patent derued if "subject matter as a whole would 
have been obVIOUS at the time the Invention was made to a person haVing ordinary skill In the 
art "). 
27. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1988) (Trademark registration derued if mark "[c]onslsts of 
or compnses Immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter wluch may disparage or 
falsely suggest a connection with persons, liVing or dead, Institutions, beliefs, or national 
symbols, or bnng them Into contempt or disrepute."). 
28. Earlier copynght statutes had been more restnctive, limiting copynght protection to 
specific categones of works. E.g., Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 
1831) ("map, chart, book"); Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, §§ 1, 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171 (repealed 
1831) ("maps, charts, book or books any Iustoncal or other pnnt or pnnts"); Act of Feb. 
3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1,4 Stat. 436, 436 (repealed 1870) ("books, map, chart, mUSical composition, 
pnnt, cut, or engraving"); Act of July' 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909) 
("book, map, chart, dramatic or mUSical composition, engraVing, cut, pnnt, or photograph or 
negative thereof, or painting, draWing, chromo, statue, statuary, and models or designs 
Intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts "). 
29. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (emphasiS added) ("Works of authorslup mclude the follOWIng cate-
gones "). The legislative Iustory of tlus provIsion makes it clear that congressional Intention 
here was to maintain an open definition of "works of authorslup." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976) ("[T]he list sets out the general area of copynghtable subject matter, 
but With suffiCient flexibility to free the courts from ngId or outmoded concepts of the scope 
of particular categones."); see also ld. at 51 ("Authors are continually finding new ways of 
expreSSIng themselves, but it IS Impossible to forsee the forms that these new expressive methods 
will take."). 
30. H.R. REp No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51. Tlus concern with keepIng aesthetic 
values out of copynght deCISions IS also Indicated by the reaction many witnesses had to a 
proposed reVlSlon to the copynght law that would have modified the standards of copynghta-
bility. In a report fIled by the Register of Copynght In May, 1961, the Register recommended 
that a reVised standard "should mention that any work, In order to be copynghtable, must 
be fIXed In some tangible form and must represent the product of ongInal creative authorslup." 
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REpORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, pt. 1, ,at 10 (Comm. 
PrInt July, 1961) (emphasiS added). The use of the word "creative" In tlus proposal resulted 
In quite a stir; those who commented on thiS recommendation were overwhelmIngly opposed 
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Congress explicitly stated that "[t]his standard does not Include requrrements 
of novelty, Ingenuity, or esthetic merit,"31 and was not Intended to alter the 
standard of ongInality established by the courts under the 1909 Act.32 
Congress also stated that "[t]he term 'literary works' does not connotate 
any criterion of literary merit or qualitative value"33 and that "the definitIOn 
of 'pIctonal, graphic, and sculptural works' carnes with it no Implied 
critenon of artistic taste, aesthetic value, or Intrinsic quality."34 Thus, in the 
1976 Act, Congress shaped the definition of copyright eligibility so as wholly 
to exclude questions of artistic value. 
B. The Lack of Substantive Evaluation as a Prerequisite 
to Copyright Protection 
The 1909 Act proVIded copynght protection to all works without requmng 
a prelimmary examination of the artistic value of the work or of the degree 
of skill or creativity involved In creating that work.3s The 1909 Act prOVIded 
to the msertion of the term "creative" due to fears that it would reqwre a subjective evaluation 
of the merits of a work as a condition to copynght protection. See HOUSE COM!.!. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 88m CONG., 1ST SESS., DIsCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REvIsION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, pt. 2, at 247 (Comm. 
Prmt Feb., 1963). M. Arthur Auslander commented, "The RegIster of Copynghts should not 
have the rIght to deny regIstration or reject copynghts on 'works of art' based upon a subjective 
evaluation as to what IS a work of art or the scope of creativity Involved m a 'work of art' 
without a search or citation. Searchmg, further, does not seem appropnate for our copynght 
proceeding." ld. Similarly, the Authors League of Amenca _ noted, "The qualification of 
'creativity' should not-be added to the Copynght Act." ld. at 260. "If courts were reqwred to 
prOVide a definition for [creativity], a WIde range of critena could develop depending upon 
personal tastes of particular judges " ld. at 313 (remarks of IrWIn Karp). "The word 
'creative' IS subject to too many mterpretations." ld. at 411 (remarks of Writers Guild of 
Amenca); see also HOUSE COM!.!. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SUPPLEMENTARY 
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REvIsION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT 
LAW: 1965 REvIsION Bn.t, pt. 6, at 3 (Comm. Pnnt May, 1965) (concern about "dangers of 
usmg a word like 'creative'" led to its elimmauon). In the end, the word "creative" was 
dropped, and when the first bills to reVISe the copynght laws were mtroduced to Congress In 
1964, neither the House bill, H.R. 11,947, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONGo REc. 16,256 (l964), 
nor the Senate bill, S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 CONGo REc. 16,260 (1964), used that 
standard. Instead, the language that was eventually adopted m 17 U.S.C. § 102 was used, that 
IS, "ongInal works of authorship IIXed In any tangible medium of expressIOn." 
31. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51. 
32.ld. 
33. ld. at 54 (quoung 17 U.S.C. § IOI). 
34.ld. 
35. Congress has never required a prelimmary examInation of works seekmg copynght 
protection to determine eligibility. The earliest statutes did, however, make regIstration and 
deposit formal prereqwsites to copynght. E.g., Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § I, I Stat. 124, 
124 (copynght begIns "from the recording of title thereof In the clerk's office "); Id. at 
§ 3 ("[N]o person shall be entitled to the benefit of tlus act unless he shall first depOSit 
a pnnted copy In the clerk's office "). There IS also some Indication that prIor 
to the twentieth century, some courts did allow judgments as to the artistic merits of a work 
to affect copynght eligibility. See Umbreit, A ConsIderation of COPYright, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 
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that copynght could be obtamed merely by publishmg a work with notice 
of copynght; there was no reqUlrement that the person seekmg copynght 
file an applicatlOn or submit the work for exammation.36 Congress provided 
for registration and deposit of the copynghted work37 and made registration 
a prereqUlsite to the nght to sue for mfnngement,38 but Congress did not 
reqUlre either reglstratlOn or deposit as prereqUlsltes to copynght itself, nor 
did it reqUlre any substantive evaluation of the work bemg submitted.39 
The 1976 Act takes tms mformality one step further. Under the 1976 Act, 
federal copynght m "ongmal works of authorsmp IlXed m any tangible 
medium of expresslOn"40 commences at the time of the work's creatlOn and 
fixatlOn.41 The person clrummg copynght need not even attach a notice or 
publish the work m order to obtrun federal copynght for the work; copynght 
eXists once the work IS IlXed.42 ReglstratlOn and deposit do have some Impact 
on the nghts prOVided to the owner of the copynght,43 but under the 1976 
Act, as with the 1909 Act, these formalities are not prerequisites to protection 
and do not mvolve any substantive evaluatlOn of the subject works.44 
932, 933 (1939) (the author states that early copynght law tended to "restnct copynght to 
works of true Intellectual or artistic Importance," a reflection of the clasSICism of the times 
and its emphasIs on scholarslup); Note, Problems, supra note 13, at 405 n.1O (citing several 
early cases In which a copynght had been demed to a work based upon Its Immoral or obscene 
content). 
36. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 10, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978) ("[AJny person entitled 
thereto by thiS title may secure copynght for hiS work by publication thereof with the notice 
of copynght reqUIred by thiS title."). The 1909 Act did prOVide, however, that copynght In 
some unpublished works could be obtaIned by regIstration. [d. at § 12. 
37. [d. at § 11. 
38. Id. at § 13. 
39. See Washlngtoman Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 37 (1939) (depositing work 
not necessary to secure copynght under the 1909 Act; publication With notice will do so); Epoch 
ProdUCing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737, 740-41 n.2 (2d Cir. 1975) ("Registration 
of the copynght In a published work IS thus not necessary to acquire the copynght, but IS 
Simply a recordation of It."), cert. demed, 424 U.S. 955 (1976); Krafft v. Cohen, 117 F.2d 
579, 580 (3d Cir. 1941) ("One secures a copyright on published matenal by accompanYing Its 
publication With a copynght notice at the place and In the form required by the statute. 
Subsequent registration under the provIsions of the statute does not create the copynght, but 
only records it."); 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 7.16[AJ, at 7-148. 
40. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
41. [d. at § 302(a). 
42. See rd. at §§ 302, 405. 
43. For example, the owner cannot sue for infringement unless the work has been regIstered. 
[d. at § 411. Also, statutory damages and attorney's fees may not be available for InfnngIng 
acts which occurred before registration. Id. at § 412. 
44. Id. at §§ 401-412. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101), even further reduced the Significance of 
these formalities by eliminating any requirement of notice as a condition to copynght protection, 
even for works that are published. Notice IS now completely optional, although Congress gave 
the owner incentives to attach notice by proViding that no weight would be gIven to the defense 
of Innocent Infnngement to mitigate damages In cases involVing works wluch had Included a 
copynght notice. [d. at 2857; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-402. 
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The ease with wInch a party can obtain a copynght stands m stark contrast 
to the procedural obstacles which the applicant must overcome m order to 
obtain either a patent or a federal trademark. Federal patent law proVIdes 
for an elaborate and detailed exammation of an applicant's chum for a 
patent.4S That exammation mvolves a substantive evaluatIOn of 'the applicant's 
claims and can take a relatively long penod of time.46 Tills exannnation 
attempts to determIne whether the alleged mvention, for wInch a patent IS 
sought, IS sufficIently novel, useful and non-obvIoUS to merit federal patent 
protection.47 Obtammg a federal trademark IS also more difficult than 
obtainmg a copynght. The party seekIng federal trademark protection must 
endure a lengthy application process durmg wInch the mark sought to be 
regIstered IS exannned m order to determIne its eligibility for federal trade-
mark regIstration.48 The distinctiveness of the mark, its potential conflict 
with preeXIsting marks and other factors are consIdered before regIstration 
is granted.49 
Thus, where Congress deSIres a mechamsm for prelimmary evaluation of 
an applicant's eligibility for other forms of federal mtellectual property 
protection, it knows how to create one. Its declSlon not to Impose such a 
mechamsm as part of copynght law reflects its deSIre to keep artistic values 
out of determinations of copyright eligibility so 
c. The ProVlszon jor Statutory Damages 
Congress' desire to exclude artistic values from the determInatIon of 
copynght protection IS also reflected m both the 1909 ActSI and the 1976 
45. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1988) (application reqUIrements); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) (specifi-
cation of clrums); 35 U.S.C. § 113 (1988) (drawmgs); 35 U.S.C. § 114 (1988) (models and 
speCImens); 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1988) (oath); 35 U.S.C. §§ 131-133 (1988) (exanunation process); 
35 U.S.C. § 134 (1988) (appeal to Board of Appeals); 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1988) (interference 
proceedings). 
46. In its annual report for fiscal year 1982, for exrunple, the CommJsslOner of Patents and 
Trademarks reported that the average time to process a patent application from filing to Issue 
was 24.2 months for utility, plant and reIssue patents. 1982 COMM'R OF PATENTS AND TRADE-
MARKS, .ANN. REP. 18. 
47. See supra note 26 (discussmg 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103). 
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988) .(application); 15 U.S.C. § 1062 (1988) (exanunation); 15 
U.S.C. § 1063 (1988) (opposition proceedings); 15 U.S.C. § 1066 (1988) (interference); 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1067-1070 (1988) (appeals to Trademark Tnal and Appeal Board); 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (1988) 
(appeals to courts). 
49. Id., see also 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1988) (standards for registrability of trademarks). 
50. The legislative Instones of the 1909 Act and 1976 Act do not explicitly discuss the 
deCISIon not to requIre prelimJnary examJnation of the merits of the work seekmg copynght, 
perhaps because tIns aspect of copynght procedure dates back to the Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 
Anne, ch. 19, under wInch protection was granted to pnnted works without any prelimJnary 
evaluation of those works. See L. PATIERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HIsTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 143-46 
(1968). Thus, Congress may have assumed, WIthout diSCUSSIon, that a preIinunary exanunation 
of the ments of a work as a prereqUIsIte to copynght would be mappropnate. 
51. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 10I(b), 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978). 
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Act,s2 by the prOVlSlon for statutory ("in lieu") damages. Even if a plamtiff 
cannot prove financIal mjury resulting from mfnngement, he or she can be 
awarded monetary relief, m the discretIOn of the judge.s3 Such prOVlSlon for 
monetary relief where the plamtiff cannot prove any sIgnificant financIal 
harm reflects Congress' belief that every work, even one without proven 
econonuc value, should be protected because the protectIon offered the 
author should not depend on market value. S4 Here, agam, Congress recog-
mzed that the artIStIC value of a work should not be the basIS for deternumng 
the scope or eXIstence of copynght m that work. 
Thus, the core structure of the copynght statutes was deSIgned to numnuze, 
if not wholly to exclude, the role of artIStIC evaluatIon m the awarding of 
copynght protection. By prOVIding copynghts to a liberally-defined set of 
works without a substantive exammation of the merits of those works, and 
by allowmg recovery of monetary awards m cases where there has not been 
any proven economIC mjUry, Congress mtended that copynght protection 
should not be dependent upon an assessment of the artIstic value of the 
work. 
II. THE "DANGEROUS UNDERTAKING" FEARED BY JUSTICE HOLMES 
Why has copynght law been shaped by the deSIre to have copynght 
granted without regard for the artistic value of a work? What IS so dangerous 
about judges "tramed only to the law" makIng decIsIons about the eligibility 
of a gIven work for copynght based upon its artistic value? If there were 
an objective standard for deternumng how to evaluate art, then presumably 
judges could apply that standard, just as they apply other standards m 
resolvmg other Issues. 
Dunng the eIghteenth and early mneteenth centunes, many people did . 
believe that there were objective critena for deternumng what IS good art or 
good literature. ThIS VIew had its roots m the Idea that art was numesIs or 
52. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
53. The first Amencan copynght statute, Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 
124-25, snnilarly prOVided a fixed munmum penalty, payable by an mfnnger, a part of winch 
went to the copynght owner sumg for mfnngement, establislnng an early fonn of the statutory 
damages remedy available today under § 504(c) of the 1976 Act. 
54. See HOUSE COMM'N ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REpORT OF THE REGISTER 
OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, pt. 1, at 102 (Comm'n 
Pnnt July, 1961). The report stated: 
Statutory damages have been a feature of the U.S. copynght statutes smce 
1790. The need for tins special remedy anses from the acknowledged madequacy 
of actual damages and profits m many cases: The value of a copynght IS, by its 
nature, difficult to establish, and the loss caused by an mfnngement IS equally 
hard to detennme. 
Id., see also H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976) ("[T]he plamtiff m an 
mfnngement suit IS not obliged to submit proof of damages and profits "). 
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ImItation of nature and that "good art" was defined on the 
basIS of the accuracy of the Imitation and the ability of the artist to 
extract umversal truths from that observation and Imitation of nature.55 
During the Enlightenment penod, Samuel Johnson,56 Sir Joshua 
55. Plato VIewed prunting and poetry as Imitative and Infenor to the truth, wluch eXIsted 
at a level tWIce removed from the prunting or poem, see PLATO, THE REpUBLIC 277-91 (A. 
Bloom trans. 1968), but also believed that true beauty could be found by studYIng physIcal 
beauty first In particular Instances and then on a more uruversal level, then studYIng moral 
beauty and the beauty of WIsdom, and ultimately amvmg at a sense of absolute beauty. See 
PLATO, THE SYMPOSIUM 92-95 (W Hrunilton trans. 1980). For Plato, however, the arts did not 
seem to have any SIgnificant role In tlus search for the knowledge of beauty. Although Plato 
generally VIewed poets skeptically, he did seem to believe that some poetry could reveal aspects 
of truth if the poet was Instructed In pnnclples of Justice, goodness and nobility. See PLATO, 
Phaedrus, In THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 522-23 (E. Hamilton & H. Crurns eds., R. 
Hackforth trans. 1961). In order to detenrune the success of a particular work, the work would 
have to be evaluated by one who had knowledge of the ongInal object beIng Imitated and 
knowledge of the accuracy of the copy and of the skill with wluch that copy had been made. 
See PLATO, LAWS 45-50 (A. Taylor trans. 1960). 
Anstotle also believed that the arts were unitative of reality, but VIewed tlus process of 
Imitation more positively than did Plato. Anstotle believed that through Imitation, the artist 
could reveal certrun uruversal truths. Anstotle thus argued that art should be Judged by the 
quality of the Imitation and the artist's adherence to certaIn rules and structures that Insured 
that the work would help to reveal these uruversal truths. Tlus vIew of the purpose of art 
underlies Anstotle's conception of the purpose and structure of tragedy. In writing drama, 
Anstotle believed that the poet must create a plot based on actions that will necessarily or 
probably occur. In other words, the dramatic plot should Imitate the uruversal pattern of human 
action In order to fulfill the purposes of art. See ARIsTOTLE, Poetics, In 2 THE COMPLETE 
WORKS OF ARIsTOTLE 2316-40 (1. Barnes ed. 1984). 
See generally M. BEARDSLEY, AEsTHET1cs FROM CLAssICAL GREECE TO THE PRESENT: A SHORT 
HIsTORY 24-67 (1966); K.E. GILBERT, & H. KUHN, A HIsroRY OF EsTHETIcs 19-45, 59-73 (1972); 
H. OSBORNE, AEsTHETIcs AND ART THEORY: AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 27-41 (1970); E. 
SCHRAPER, PRELUDE TO AEsTHET1cs 42-118 (1968). 
56. In Ius Preface to Shakespeare published In 1765, Johnson argued that the longevity of 
Shakespeare's excellent reputation was based on the fact that Shakespeare was "above all 
writers, at least above all modem writers, the poet of nature; the poet that holds up to Ius 
readers a faithful rrurrour of manners and of life." S. JOHNSON, Preface to Shakespeare, In 
RAssELAS, POEMS, AND SELECTED PROSE 263 (B. Bronson 3d ed. 1971) (1795). Johnson c1rumed 
that art should rrurror life: 
NothIng can please many, and please long, but Just representations of general 
nature. The Irregular combInations of fanciful Invention may delight a-while, 
by that novelty of wluch the common satiety of life sends us all In quest; but the 
pleasures of sudden wonder are soon exhausted, and the rrund can only repose 
on the stability of truth. 
[d. at 263. Imitating nature was not enough, however; Johnson critiCIZed Shakespeare for 
seerrung "to write without any moral purpose." [d. at 271. "He sacrifices vIrtue to converuence, 
and he IS so much more careful to please than to Instruct Tlus fault the barbarity of Ius 
age cannot extenuate; for it IS always a writer's duty to make the world better, and. Justice IS 
a VIrtue Independant [SIC] on time or place." [d., see also S. JOHNSON, The Rambler No.4, 
Saturday, March 31, 1750, In ld. at 70 ("It IS Justly conSIdered as the greatest excellency of 
art, to Imitate nature; but it IS necessary to distinguIsh those parts of nature, wluch are .most 
proper for Imitation "). Johnson stated In S. JOHNSON, The History of Rasselas, In ld. at 
628-29 (1759): 
The bUSIness of a poet IS to exrurune, not the IndiVIdual, but the specIes 
But the knowledge of nature IS only half the task of a poet; he must be acqurunted 
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Reynolds,57 and othersS8 elaborated on thts VIew and argued that through 
reason they could deduce specific rules and critena whtch poets and pamters 
should follow In order to achteve the Anstotelian goal of finding the uruversal 
pnncipies of nature and human nature and thus create "good art." 
By the runeteenth century, however, the VIew that art had to nnitate nature 
and adhere to formal rules was challenged by the Romantic VIew that art 
[d. 
likeWIse wIth all the modes of life. He must wnte as the Interpreter of nature, 
and the legIslator of mankInd, and conSIder hImself as presIding over the thoughts 
and manners of future generatIons; as a beIng supenour to tIme and place. 
57 In hIs Discourses on Art, Sir Joshua Reynolds attempted to Instruct young artists on 
the prIncIples and goals of good patntIng. Reynolds believed that only through the exercIse of 
reason could one discover the standards of good taste. In December, 1776, he wrote: 
[W]e will conclude, that whatever goes under the name of taste, whIch we can 
fatrly bnng under the domInIon of reason, must be conSIdered as equally exempt 
from change. If therefore, In the course of thIS enquIry, we can shew that there 
are rules for the conduct of the artIst whIch are fIxed and Invanable, it follows 
of course, that the art of the connOIsseur, or, In other words, taste, has likeWIse 
Invanable pnnclples. 
J. REYNOLDS, DISCOURSES ON ART 98-99 (S. Mitchell ed. 1965) (1776). Reynolds went on to 
say: 
It IS reason and good sense therefore whIch ranks and estImates every art, and 
every part of that art, according to ItS Importance We will not allow a man, 
who shall prefer the Infenor style, to say it IS hIS taste; taste here has nothIng, 
or at least ought to have nothIng to do with the question. He wants not taste, 
but sense, and soundness of Judgment. 
[d. at 105. He further commented: 
[T]he real substance of what goes under the name of taste, IS fIXed and 
established In the nature of thIngs; that there are certatn and regular causes by 
whIch the ImagInation and passIons of men are affected; and that the knowledge 
of these causes IS acquIred by a labonous and diligent InvestigatIon of nature 
[d. at 109. 
Reynolds, like Johnson, believed that art should Imitate nature, and further believed, as with 
Johnson's vIew of literature, that In ImItatIng nature, the patnter was to go beyond mere 
reproductions and to seek uruversal truths: "The WIsh of the genUIne patnter must be more 
extensIve: Instead of endeavounng to amuse mankInd WIth the mInute neatness of hIs ImitatIons, 
he must endeavour to Improve them by the grandeur of hIS Ideas .. [d. at 27. In order to 
do thIs the artist had to study nature because only by "long labonous comparIson" could that 
artist acquIre "a Just Idea of beautiful fonns .. [d. at 29. UltImately, however, It was 
through the exercIse of reason combIned WIth thIS study of nature that the artist would fInd 
truth and thus beauty: "As our art IS not a diVIne gift, so neIther IS It a mecharucal trade. Its 
foundatIons are laId In solid sCIence: and practice, though essential to perfection, can never 
attatn that to whIch it alms, unless It works under the directIon of prIncIple." [d. at 92 
(emphaSIS In ongInal). 
58. E.g., J. DRYDEN, A Defence of an Essay of Dramatic Poesy, In 1 EssAYS OF JOHN 
DRYDEN 110-33 (W Ker ed. 1900) (1668). Dryden wrote: 
Poesy must resemble natural truth, but It must be ethIcal. Indeed, the poet dresses 
truth, and adorns nature, but does not alter them Therefore that IS not the 
best poesy whIch resembles notions of thIngs that are not, to thIngs that are: 
though the fancy may be great and the words flOWIng, yet the soul IS but half 
satIsfIed when there IS not truth In the foundation. 
[d. at 121 (emphasIS In ongInal). See generally M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 55, at 140-79; E. 
CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 3-27, 275-331 (F Koelln & J. Pettegrove 
trans. 1951). 
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should be a form of self-expressiOn reflecting the emotions and personality 
of the artist. Wordsworth expressed such a VIew of poetry In writing: 
[p]oetry IS the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: it takes its 
ongm from emotion recollected m tranquillity: the emotion IS contem-
plated till, by a specIes of re-action, the tranquillity gradually disappears, 
and an emotion, kIndred to that whIch was before the subject of 
contemplation, IS gradually produced, and does, actually eXIst m the 
mmd. In thIs II!ood successful composition generally begIns S9 
ThIS emphasIS on the IndivIdual artist and the expreSSiOn of emotion was 
difficult to reconcile with any fIxed, objective critenafor defImng good art. 
As Colendge wrote In 1817: 
The ultimate end of criticIsm IS much more to establish the pnnclples of 
writing, than to furrush rules how to pass Judgement on what has been 
written by others. For, even as truth IS its own light and eVIdence, 
discovenng at once itself and falsehood, so IS it the prerogative of poetic 
gemus to distinguIsh by parental mstinct its proper offspnng from the 
changelings Could a rule be gIven from without, poetry would 
cease to be poetry, and smk mto a mechamcal art.60 
59. W WORDSWORTH, Preface to the Second Edition of Lyrrcal Ballads, In SELECTED POEMS 
AND PREFACES 460 (J. Stillinger ed. 1965) (2d ed. 1800); see also J. Mn.L, Thoughts on Poetry 
and Its Varieties, In THE SIX GREAT HUMANISTIC EssAYS OF JOHN STUART MILL 3-24 (1969) 
(1833). Mill wrote: 
The peculiarity of poetry appears to us to lie In the poet's utter unconscIOusness 
of a listener. Poetry IS feeling confessIng itself to itself In moments of solitude, 
and embodYIng itself In symbols whtch are the nearest possible representations of 
the feeling In the exact shape In whtch it eXISts In the poet's mInd. 
Id. at 8. With regard to paInting, Mill contended that "[tlhe power of paInting lies In poetry, 
not In narrative " Id. at 12. He further contended that it IS In the depIction of 
IndiVIduals that thts poetry IS expressed because the figures "express the feelings of one person 
as modified by the presence of others." Id. See generally M. ABRAMS, THE MIRROR AND THE 
LAMP: ROMANTIC THEORY AND THE CluncAL TRADmON 21-26, 48-56 (1953); M. BEARDSLEY, 
supra note 55, at 244-65; G. PISCHEL, A WORLD HISTORY OF ART 578·97 (1975). 
60. S. COLERIDGE, Biographra Literarra, c. XCIII (1817), In ENGLISH LITERARY ClunCISM: 
ROMANTIC AND VICTORIAN 87-89 (D. Hoffman and S. Hynes eds. 1963); see also M. BEARDSLEY, 
supra note 55, at 247 (The Romantics broadened the scope of "good, or great, art to 
Include works whose comparative loosemng of form IS c.onsldered to be offset by a more 
pOIgnant or more IndiVIdualized presentation of personal emotions "). Immanuel Kant had 
prOVIded some of the groundwork for questiomng the notion of an objective definition of good 
taste. Kant believed that judgments of taste are not cognitive but SUbjective reactions where, In 
matters of pure taste, our aesthetic reactions to an object are based not on our Interest In the 
function of the object or our desIre for the object, but rather are based on a diSInterested 
reaction to the aesthetic surface of the object, freed from its particular function. Although thts 
reaction IS described as "subjective," In the sense that it IS not based on lOgIC or cognition but 
based on producmg pleasure In the subject expenencmg the object, In Kant's VIew these 
SUbjective reactions were assumed to be umversally shared, that IS, that anyone VIewIng that 
object would react 10 the SaIne way, based on the way that object would promote the harmony 
of theIr ImagInation and understanding. I. KANT, Critique of Judgment, In PHILOSOPIDCAL 
WRmNGS 150-200 (J. Meredith trans., E. Behler ed. 1986) (1790). Kant attempted to reconcile 
the conflict between the claIm to the validity of IndiVIdual taste and the claIm to a "correct" 
umversal standard of taste by describmg judgments of taste as based not on detenrunate, but 
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There was thus a tensIOn emergmg between the classIcal vIew of the creative 
process and critIcIsm of creative works and the Romantic vIew of these 
matters. 
JustIce Holmes' oplruon m Blelstem v Donaldson Lithographmg CO.61 
and its often-quoted line about the dangers of Judges makmg determmatlons 
of artIStIC merit62 reflects thIs tensIon between the claSSIcal vIew that creative 
works should conform to formal, objective critena and the Romantic VIew 
that the creatIve process IS a more subjective, personal reflectIon of the 
mdivldual artISt and thus that creative works are harder to Judge on the 
basIS of objective critena. In Blelstem, the plamtiffs alleged that the defendant 
had mfnnged theIr copynght m certam cIrcus advertismg posters. Justice 
Holmes concluded that neither the fact that a work was used for commercIal 
purposes nor the fact that a work was of "little merit or of humble degree"63 
was a basIS for denymg copynght to such a work. He then explored the 
nsks created if the courts were to make deCISIons about the artistic worthIness 
of a work. 
In part, Justice Holmes' oplruon reflected the vIew that there IS no objective 
basIS for evaluating art. Holmes womed that if Judges decIded copyright 
matters on the basIS of artistIC merit, "some works of geruus would be sure 
to mIss appreclatlOn"64 because the declSlon makers mIght not be sophIsti-
cated enough to recogruze the value of a gIven work at a gIven time. ThIs 
would be especIally true with works conSIdered avant-garde: "TheIr very 
novelty would make them repulsIve until the public had learned the new 
language m whIch theIr author spoke."6s Justice Holmes cited as one example 
the pamtmgs of Manet,66 whIch met with public disapproval when first 
exhibited m the 1860s, but whIch, by 1903, were not only accepted but 
hIghly valued by the public as well as the art world.67 Justice Holmes seemed 
concerned that allowmg deCISIon makers to rely on theIr personal artistic 
values would lead to a derual of copynght protection for works that later 
generations mIght conSIder to be works of artistic geruus. As a result, creatIve 
mdetenrunate concepts, and concluding that "[t]o supply a detenrunate objective pnnClple of 
taste m accordance with winch its Judgements ffilght be denved, tested, and proved, IS an 
absolute Impossibility, for then it would not be a Judgement of taste." [d. at 242. Kant believed, 
however, that tins mdetenrunate Judgment of taste was a Judgment winch could fmd some 
uruversality based on the free play of cognitive faculties winch are shared by everyone. [d. at 
173-76. See generally M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 55, at 212-24; D. CRAWFORD, KANT's AEsnnmc 
THEORY 111-18 (1974); K. Gn.BERT & H. KUHN, supra note 55, at 321-44; 1. KANT, supra, at 
xii; 1. KNox, THE AEsTHETIC THEORIES OF KANT, HEGEL AND SCHOPENHAUER 19-44 (1958); H. 
OSBORNE, supra note 55, at 171-91. 
61. 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
62. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanymg text. 
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expreSSIOn might stagnate because artists mIght be Induced to' follow tradi-
tional, conservative modes of expreSSIon, rather than to develop new and 
expenmental modes of expreSSIOn. Thus, Holmes recogruzed that artistic 
standards change over time and that there IS no unchangIng objective basIS 
for evaluating art on which judges can rely In deterImmng copynght protec-
tion. 
Justice Holmes also realized that a second nsk would be created if "persons 
trained only to the law" decided the worth of a creative work: "[C]opyright 
would be demed to pictures whIch appealed to a public less educated than 
the judge."68 That IS, In Justice Holmes' VIew, although judges mIght not 
be sophIsticated enough to apprecIate the avant-garde, they could be too 
sophIsticated to apprecIate the tastes of the general public. Since such works 
have econOmIC value, In Justice Holmes' VIew, the creator IS entitled to 
protection from those who would copy such works and deny the creator the 
fInancIal benefits to whIch he or she is entitled, even though such works 
may fail to meet Justice Holmes' personal VIew of good art. Justice Holmes 
did not, however, conceal hIs own low opImon of such taste, as revealed In 
hIs comment that such taste IS "an ultimate fact for the moment, whatever 
may be our hopes for a change. "69 However, he conceded that works that 
68. BlelStem, 188 u.S. at 251-52. 
69. ld. at 252. Justice Holmes had very definite oplmons about what constituted "good 
art" and "good literature." Born mto an anstocratic and mtellectual Boston family m 1841, 
he grew up surrounded by some of the "best table conversation" m Boston. THE MIND AND 
FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES: HIS SPEECHES, EssAYS, LETTERS, AND JUDICIAL OPINIONS at xvii (M. 
Lerner ed. 1946) [heremafter M. Lerner]. See generally S. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE 
LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 9-28 (1989). His father, Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, was a 
famous phYSICIan and poet, and was active m the Boston literary world. He had very orthodox 
standards of good taste grounded m what he considered moral values and tned to mstill those 
values and standards m hls son, with varying degrees of success. M. HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS 1841-1870, at 11-17 (1957); M. Lerner, supra, at xvii-
XXI. Some of thls mfluence was reflected m an essay the younger Holmes wrote while a student 
at Harvard College, m whlch he wrote that "there IS nothlng m literature so elevating" as the 
clasSIC books of great literature, whlch he defined as mcluding Shakespeare, Montrugne, Goethe, 
Plato, ConfucIUS, among others, and that "[t]he great secret of all delight m literature IS 
preservmg thls fineness of taste " M. HOWE, supra, at 45 (quoting Books, 4 HARv MAG. 
408 (1858». Later college essays on Plato and Durer and book reViews reflected Holmes' belief 
that art should seek to capture Ideals and umversal truths. M. HOWE, supra, at 56-59, 60-61. 
Holmes apparently, however, was not narrowly selective m hls chOICes of reading books; he 
was a voracIous reader whose tastes ranged from philosophy and the clasSICS to detective stones 
and modem novels. J. MONAGAN, THE GRAND PANJANDRUM: MEllOW YEARS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 
103-08 (1988). Holmes also was very mterested m art pnnts and engravmgs, whlch he studied 
and collected. ld. at 108. Max Lerner clrumed that thls personal mterest IS reflected m Holmes' 
ruling m BlelStem that the copynght statute could protect lithographs. M. Lerner, supra, at 
208-09. 
On the other .hand, Holmes did recogmze that there might not be unammity m matters of 
taste. In 1902, he wrote to Lady Pollock about some books that he had been reading. Although 
he stated hls own opmlOns on literature quite vehemently ("a picture of a squalid and worthless 
life IS a kmd of art m whlch I take little pleasure"), he also recogmzed that others' tastes could 
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appeal to the public's taste must be gIven copynght protection because "the 
taste of any public IS not to be treated with contempt. "70 Thus, Holmes' 
opIruon reflects the paradox presented by the tension between the classIcal 
and RomantIc VIews of art: there IS no objective baSIS for evaluating art, 
but some art IS better than other art. 
ThIs paradox presented by the tenSIOn between the ClasSICal and Romantic 
VIews of art has been exacerbated dunng the twentieth century by the 
continumg challenge to the VIew that artistic value can be ObjectIvely deter-
mmed. George Santayana wrote m 1896 that "beauty IS a speCIes of value,"71 
and that "[v]alues spnng from the Immediate and mexplicable reactIon of 
vital Impulse, and from the IrratIonal part of our nature."72 Santayana 
argued that determmations of beauty are not mtellectual judgments or 
judgments of fact, but judgments of value that are based on whether or not 
the gIven work produces the sensation of aesthetIc pleasure. An accurate 
ImitatIOn IS aesthetically valuable not because it IS true or realistIc, but 
because our perception of that truth or realism produces pleasure.73 Santayana 
also recogruzed that the clrum of uruversality m aesthetic Judgment was 
maccurate. 
There IS notonously no great agreement upon aesthetic matters; and such 
agreement as there IS, IS based upon SImilarity of ongm, nature, and 
differ from hiS: 
Well, to be Civilized IS to be potentially master of all possible Ideas, and that 
means that one has got beyond being shocked, although one preserves one's own 
moral and aesthetic preferences. I regard the latter, however, as more or less 
arbitrary, although none the less dogmatic on that account. We tacitly 
postulate that if others were as Intelligent and well educated as we they would be 
compelled to agree with us-but that IS a mere Ideal, not an actuality. 
Letter from O.W Holmes to Lady Pollock (Sept. 6, 1902), reprinted In 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK 
LETIERS 105 (M. Howe ed. 1941). 
Recogruzlng these indiVidual differences, however, did not mean for Holmes that there was 
no "objective reality In wruch IS to be found the unity of our several compulSIOns "; 
ultimately, he left that as a question to be addressed by philosophers. Similarly, In a letter to 
Harold J. Laski In 1926, Holmes responded to Laski's "raptures over Jane Austen," WIth 
wruch Holmes appeared to disagree as follows: "She srunes In the firmament of your world 
You are the God of that, but the religion of taste IS polytheistic." Letter from O.W Holmes 
to H.J. Laski (Aug. 5, 1926), reprinted In HOLMEs-LASKI LE'ITERS 863 (M. Howe ed. 1953). 
Thus, although Holmes held very strong views of what he liked In art and literature, he 
recogruzed that others could hold different VIews. ThiS IS generally consIstent WIth Holmes' 
overall view that law IS not based on moral absolutes, but developed by human bemgs to meet 
and to reflect the cIrcumstances of the times. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. 
REv. 457 (1897). See generally Laski, The Political Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes, 40 
HARv L. REv 683, 685-89 (1931); McKinnon, The Secret of Mr. Justice Holmes, 36 A.B.A. 
J. 261 (1950). McKinnon describes the nihilistic aspects of Holmes' philosophy. Id. at 344. 
That IS, there may be a conflict between the philosophiC vIews Holmes promoted m hiS wntmgs 
and those deeply held values upon wruch he actually acted In deCIding cases. 
70. BlelSteln, 188 U.S. at 252. 
71. G. -SANTAYANA, THE SENSE OF BEAUTY 24 (P Rice ed. 1955). 
72.Id. 
73. Id. at 25-26. 
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circumstance among men, a slInilarity wInch, where it eXlsts, tends to 
bnng about Identity m all Judgments and feelings. It IS unmeanmg to 
say that what IS beautiful to one man ought to be beautiful to another. 
If their senses are the same, therr associations and dispositions slIllilar, 
then the same tInng will certamly be beautiful to both.74 
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Although Santayana thus believed aesthetic values were subjectively deter-
mined and based to some extent on the personal background of the observer, 
he also believed that taste was a value that could be developed and that 
exposure to beauty led to a finer aesthetic sensibility.7s Thus, like Justice 
Holmes, he believed that all taste was relative, but that some people's taste 
was better than others. 
John Dewey, writing m 1934, criticIZed the art establishment for removmg 
the expenence of art from the realities of ordinary expenence. He objected 
to setting art on a pedestal and to "the nse of the compartmental conception 
of fine art. "76 Dewey also objected to traditional art criticIsm whlch Imposed 
formal rules and standards on art m order to judge it, and he specifically 
rejected the neoclassical approach to Judging art. He also, however, rejected 
the opposite approach to critiCIsm whlch derued the existence of any objective 
values at all, or what he described as the "impressiorustic" approach m 
whlch the critic clrums that all that criticism can provIde IS SImply the 
individual reactions of the critic to the particular work of art. Dewey argued 
that true critiCIsm should state "what a work of art IS as an expenence" 
because domg so "may render particular expenences of partIcular works of 
art more pertinent to the object expenenced, more aware of its own content 
and mtent."77 Thus, according to Dewey, critics should know about the 
hIStOry of art, about the background of the mdividual artist and about that 
artist's other works m order to understand and apprecIate the expenence of 
the artist m creating the work of art. For Dewey, "[t]he functIon of criticIsm 
IS the reeducation of perception of works of art .. . The conception that 
its busmess IS to appraIse, to judge m the legal and moral sense, arrests the 
perception of those who are mfluenced. by the criticIsm that assumes this 
task. "78 Thus, Dewey believed that a work of art should be valued for the 
expenence that created it and for what the work can tell an audience about 
74. Jd. at 44 (emphasIS In onglnal). 
75. See ld. at 80-82, 114, 127-30. 
76. J. DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE 8 (1934). He attributed tlns In part to capitalism and 
the development of modern Industry and commerce and saw works of art becoming econonuc 
commodities valued as Investments and as status symbols, not for. theIr aesthetic qualities. Jd. 
at 8-9. 
77. Jd. at 309; see also ld. at 298-309. 
78. Jd. at 324. Other writers who rejected the neoclasSIcal vIew that art should Imitate 
nature and conform to certain formal rules and standards Include Benedetto Croce, see generally 
B. CROCE, AEsrHEnc AS SCIENCE OF EXPRESSION AND GENERAL LINGUISTIC 170-210 (D. Amslie 
trans. 1909), and R. Collingwood, see generally R. COLLINGWOOD, EssAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF ART 55-77, 121-28 (A. Donegan ed. 1964). 
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that expenence, not for its ability to conform to specific ObjectIve critena. 
In current discourse, many writers argue that our definitions and modes 
of evaluating and criticIZmg art and literature are culturally determmed and 
reflect the mdividual background and Identity of the mdividual vIewmg the 
work. For example, Barbara Herrnstem Slnith clrums that "[o]ur mterpre-
tation of a work and our expenence of its value are mutually dependent, 
and each depends upon what IDlght be called the psychologIcal 'set' of our 
encounter with it: the nature and potency of our own assumpuons, 
expectatIOns, capacities, and mterests with respect to it "79 Slnith sug-
gests: 
[W]hat we may be domg when we make an explicit value Judgment 
of a literary work IS (a) articulating an estimate of how well that work 
will serve certain Implicitly defined functions (b) for a specific Implicitly 
defined audience, (c) who are conceIved of as expenencmg the work 
under certain Implicitly defined conditions. 80 
In other words, Smith believes that all judgments about a literary work (or 
any other work of art, for that matter) are a function of the Identity and 
background of the observer and the expectations that the observer has with 
respect both to the function or classification of the work bemg expenenced 
and to the particular audience that will also be expenencmg that work.81 
Thus, according to Smith, there can only be "umversally shared ObjectIve 
standards" m a totally homogeneous SOCIety that IS msulated from external 
mfluences and safe from mternal dissensIOn.82 Smith argues that with the 
more tYPICal heterogeneous SOCIety, mdividuals will agree on matters of taste 
with respect to works that satisfy the types of needs and mterests that are 
WIdely shared by the mdividuals m that community; conversely, the mdivI-
duals m that srune community will tend to disagree on matters of taste with 
respect to works that satisfy the types of needs and mterests wmch are not 
WIdely shared by the mdividuals m that community Those m authority m 
such communitIes will thus have an mterest m validatmg the community's 
shared taste m order to mruntrun stability and justify theIr authority. It IS 
essentially through thIS kmd of process, according to Smith, that the estab-
lished Western canon of literary and artistIc works was established and IS 
perpetuated.83 
Other writers have made sIlnilar clrums. Terry Eagleton84 has argued that 
what we mean by literature IS a "mghly valued kmd of writing,"BS and that smce 
79. B. SMITH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES FOR CRITICAL THEORY 
10 (1988). 
80. Id. at 13. 
81. See generally rd. at 9-16, 30-35. 
82. Id. at 93. 
83. Id. at 24-27, 35-53. 
84. E.g., T. EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (1983). Eagleton chums that 
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value-Judgements are notonously varIable. There IS no such thIng as 
a literary work or tradition whIch IS valuable In itself, regardless of what 
anyone mIght have SaId or come to say about it. 'Value' IS a transitive 
tenn: it means whatever IS valued by certaIn people In specific situations, 
according to particular critena and In the light of gIven purposes.86 
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Others have argued that all defInitions of art are institutionally determmed 
by the art world and its cultural practices and conventions and that there 
are no external, objective determmants of what IS art.87 The tendency m 
postmodern art and literature to collapse the boundarIes between "hIgh 
culture" and popular culture and between different genres and art forms 
has also been seen as a rejection of the clasSIcal defInition of art and of the 
the nse of English literature In the eighteenth and mneteenth centunes was essentially political, 
that IS, that literature was used by the political and economic elite as propaganda to "com-
mumcate to [the workIng classes] the moral nches of bourgeOIs Civilization and curb 
In them any disruptive tendency to collective political action." [d. at 25. After diSCUSSIng the 
vanous theones and approaches to literary critiCism, Eagleton concludes that all literary theory 
IS also political and IdeolOgical and that "[d]epartments of literature In higher education 
are part of the IdeolOgical apparatus of the modem capitalist state," ld. at 200, whIch perpetuate 
the reactionary notion that literature can be defined and critiCized In a way that IS not based 
on political values. See generally Id. at 194-205. 
85. [d. at 10. 
86. [d. at 11; see also J. WOJ:FF, AEsTHETICS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF ART (1983). Wolff 
chums: 
CritiCism, and the hIstory of art and literature, then, are IdeolOgical, both In the 
sense that they ongInate and are practised In particular SOCial conditions, and bear 
the mark of those conditions, and In the sense that they systematically obscure 
and deny these very determInants and ongIns. It IS for thiS reason that aesthetics 
can take no reassurance from criticism that 'the great tradition' really IS great. 
The great tradition IS the product of the hIstory of art, the history of art 
lustory, and the hIstory of art CntlCIsm, each of whIch, In its tum, IS the SOCial 
hIstory of groups, power relations, Institutions and established practices and 
conventions. 
[d. at 16; see also N. HADJINICOLAOU, ART HISTORY AND CLAss STRUGGLE (L. Asmal trans. 
1978). Hadjimcolaou argIles that all works of art contaln a ViSUal Ideology, whIch he defines 
as "the way In whIch the formal and thematic elements of a picture are combIned on each 
specific occasion. This combInation IS a particular form of the overall Ideology of a SOCial 
class." [d. at 95. In other words, every work of art alludes to a particular SOCial reality that 
IS a reflection of a particular SOCial class. See ld. at 95-183. Hadjimcolaou concludes that 
Judgments concernIng the aesthetic value of a given work of art are a product of the Identity 
of the particular Judge: "[A]esthetic effect IS none other than the pleasure felt by the observer 
when he recogmzes hImself In a picture's visual Ideology." [d. at 182; see also Bourdieu, THE 
ARiSTOCRACY OF CuLTURE, 2 MEDIA, CuLTURE AND SOCIETY 225 (1980) (author conSiders high 
culture as a product of the anstocracy that IS best appreCiated by those liVIng under certain 
conditions and that IS valued for how it facilitates class distinctions). 
In addition, psycholOgical studies have been done to demonstrate that aesthetic reactions 
vary, to some extent, based on gender, age and cultural background. R. PICKFORD, PSYCHOLOGY 
AND VISUAL AEsTHETIcs 150-80 (1972) (survey of studies companng reactions to colors, pictures, 
patterns, portraits and other ViSUal works, based on race, gender, age and cultural background). 
87. See G. DICKIE, ART AND THE AEsTHETIC: AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 27-52, 170-81 
(1974); cj. Carroll, Art, Practice, and Narrative, 71 THE MONIST 140-55 (1988). 
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notion that artIstIc value can be objectively determIned.88 Although some 
dispute these VIews and CrItIcIze the consequences of relatIvIsm and "stan-
dardlessness" that .they fear these VIews may cause,89 there IS no doubt that 
the VIew that there IS an ObjectIve definitIOn of artIstIc value IS no longer 
taken as a given.~ 
ThIS growIng twentieth-century skeptIcIsm regarding the eXIstence of any 
objective or neutral defimtIOn of artIstic value helps to explaIn why Congress 
and the courts are reluctant to allow cOPYrIght determInations to be made 
on the basIs of a Judge's VIew of a work's artIstic value. If determInatIOns 
of artIstIc value reflect the background and Identity of the IndivIdual decIsIon 
maker and there IS no ObjectIve test of artistIc merit, then works created by 
those and for those whose background and values are different from those 
of the decIsIOn maker may not be apprecIated by that deCISIon maker. The 
cultural understanding and values that would be reflected In copynght 
deCISIons could be startlingly narrow if based upon Judges' VIews of artIstic 
value. 
JustIce Holmes' warmngs about the "dangerous undertakIng" are thus 
understandable. If WrIters such as Smith and Eagleton are rIght and there IS 
88. See L. HUTCHEON, A POETICS OF POSTMODERNISM 3-20, 40-43 (1988). Hutcheon claims: 
[Postmodermsm] does not so much deny as contest the "truths" of reality and 
fiction-the human constructs by which we manage to live m our world. Fiction 
does not mirror reality; nor does It reproduce It. It cannot. There IS no pretense 
of simplistic mimesIs m hlstonographlc metafictlOn. Instead, fiction IS offered as 
another of the discourses by which we construct our vemons of reality 
Id. at 40; see also F Jameson, Postmodermsm and Consumer Society, m POST MODERNISM 
AND ITS DISCONTENTS 13-29 (E. Kaplan ed. 1988). 
89. See, e.g., E. HIRSCH, JR., CULTURAL LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO 
KNow (1987); A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987). Hirsch disagrees with 
those who argue that teachmg the traditional literary canon IS a means of preservmg the status 
quo and cntlclzes those changes m our educational system that have meant that children are 
not bemg exposed to the established elements of our literate culture. E. HIRSCH, supra, at 20-
24, 125-26, 144. On the other hand, Hirsch recogmzes that the formation of a natIOnal culture, 
as well as the creation of national languages, IS a conscIous process done for the purpose of 
creating certam shared expenences and values to facilitate commumcatlon among members of 
that nation. Id. at 70-93. Hirsch thus IS not contending that the elements of our literate culture 
are objectively better than other works or cultures, but rather that It IS essential for members 
of our culture to have the background knowledge of those elements m order to function wlthm 
thiS culture. Bloom IS less tempered m hiS condemnatIOn of what he conSiders "cultural 
relatiVism'" "The unrestramed and thoughtless pursUIt of openness, Without recogmzmg the 
mherent political, SOCial or cultural problem of openness as the goal of nature, has rendered 
openness meamngless. Cultural relatiVism destroys both one's good and the good." A. BLOOM, 
supra, at 38. Bloom cntlclzes contemporary education for failing to reqUIre students to read 
what Bloom conSiders the classIcs, Id. at 62-67, and conSiders femmlsm "the latest enemy of 
the vitality of claSSIC texts." Id. at 65. Bloom says that "[t]he failure to read good books both 
enfeebles the vIsion and strengthens our most fatal tendency-the belief that the here and now 
IS all there IS." Id. at 64. Bloom calls for a return to a traditional "Great Books" approach 
to liberal education, m which students read the "claSSIC" texts. Id. at 336-47 
90. ThiS IS also eVident m the heated debate gomg on m academiC Circles over the proper 
content of the educational curnculum. See, e.g., Berger, Ibn Batuta and Sitar Challengmg 
Marco Polo and Violin m Schools, N.Y Times, Apr. 12, 1989, at AI, col. 1. 
1990] ARTISTIC VALUE JUDGMENTS 195 
no objective basis for determmmg artistic value, then allowmg judges to 
determine copyright protection on the basis of their view as to a work's 
artistic value would result m subjective determmations based upon the judges' 
own cultural expenences and values. Given the problems and unfrurness that 
tills would cal,lse, it would be best if copynght mfringement declSlons could 
be made without regard to a judge's view of the artistic value of the work. 
Part III will explore how the courts have attempted to accomplish that goal. 
III. THE COURTS' ATTEMPTS TO AVOID ARTISTIC VALUES 
IN DETERMINING COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: 
THE IDEA-ExPRESSION DICHOTOMY 
In Part I, we discussed how Congress designed the basic structure of the 
copyright statutes to msure that a given work would be eligible for copynght, 
regardless of its p,ercelved artistic value.91 As a practical matter, however, 
91. Although there have been cases where the lack of merit m a particular work has been 
a factor relied upon m denYIng copynghtability to the overall work, e.g., Toro Co. v. R & R 
Prod. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986) (numbenng system used m plamtiffs catalogs 
for sales of replacement parts for lawn care maclunes held uncopynghtable because "[t]he 
random and arbitrary use of numbers m the public domam does not evmce enough ongmality 
to distingUish authorslup"); Durham Industnes v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 
1980) (plastic reproductions of cartoon characters lacked suffiCient ongmality to be copynghtable 
smce there was "notlung recogruzably the author's own contribution" to the prevIOusly created 
characters); L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.) (plastic replica of an antique 
bank not suffiCiently skilled or ongmal to be copynghtable), cert. demed, 429 U.S. 857 (1976), 
by and large, the mitial question of copynghtability has been answered without regard to the 
underlYIng artistic value of the work as perceived by the Judge. One broad exception IS the rule 
that prOVides: 
[f]he design of a useful article shall be conSidered a plctonal, grapluc or 
sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design mcorporates 
plctonal, grapluc, or sculptural features that can be Identified separately from, 
and are capable of existing mdependently of, the utilitanan aspects of the article. 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Many commentators have argued that the application of tlus rule m 
determmmg the copynghtability of a useful article VIOlates the B1elStem nondiscrurunation 
pnnclple because it IS easier to Identify artistic features that can eXist mdependently of the 
useful article if those features are m a traditional, representational style than if they are abstract, 
contemporary designs. E.g., Derucola, Applied Art and Industrzal Design: A Suggested Approach 
to Copyrzght m Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REv 707 (1983); Reichman, Design Protection m 
Domestic and Foreign Copyrzght Law: From the Berne ReVISion of 1948 to the Copyrzght Act 
of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143; Note, Works of Applied Art: An expansion of Copyrzght 
Protection, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 241 (1982); Note, Copyrzght Law-Copyrzght Protection for 
Industrial Designs Under the 1976 Copyrzghts Act, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 923 (1979). These 
commentators all believe m the Wisdom of ilie BlelStem rule and have proposed different ways 
of determlrung the copynghtability of useful articles to aVOid the subjectivity that the "sepa-
rability" test seems to produce. For example, Professor Derucola suggests that the focus should 
be on the process of creating the work, not on the end product itself; the determmation of 
copynghtability should be based on the extent to wluch the process of creating the work 
"reflects artistic expression urunhibited by functional conSiderations." Derucola, supra, at 741. 
Professor Reichman, on the other hand, contrasts the Amencan approach to useful articles 
with the systems used m oilier nations, for example, the French failure to distinguish useful 
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the real test of copynght IS not whether the plamtiff IS consIdered to have 
created a work that IS generally eligible for copynght protectIOn, but whether 
the plamtiff will be able to obtam relief agamst someone who has allegedly 
mfnnged that copyrIght. In other words, the real value of the copynght m 
a gIven work IS measured by the scope of protection it provIdes to the 
copynght owner who claIms that hIs or her copynght m that work has been 
mfrmged. These declSlons determmmg the scope of copyrIght protection m 
a work alleged to be mfrmged have been substantially affected by determI-
natIOns of that work's artIstic value. In order to apprecIate how these 
determmatIOns of artistic value affect mfrmgement declSlons, one must first 
understand how courts determme copyrIght mfnngement. 
A. The Process of DetermznIng Infringement and the Role 
of the Idea-Expresszon Dzchotomy 
Congress did not provIde any clear gUIdelines for courts to use m deter-
mIrung mfrmgement, but left it to the courts to develop therr own method-
ology and standards.92 In essence, courts today engage m a two-step process 
m determIrung copynght mfrmgement. First, the court must determtne if the 
alleged mfnnger had access to the plaIntiff's work. Since copynght law only 
protects agaInst actual copymg of the protected matenal, not the comcIdental 
mdependent creation of a SImilar work, a party cannot be held liable for 
mfnngement if that party never saw the protected work. Thus, the first step 
articles from other works of art for purposes of copynght, and the Italian separate treatment 
of useful articles. Reichman, supra, at 1143. Reichman concluded that smce the United States 
copynght statute contruns a "separability" prOVISion, there should be an entirely separate statute 
to proVide protection to mdustnal deSigns. Reichman, supra, at 1260-64. A full diSCUSSion of 
thiS particular problem IS beyond the scope of thIs Article, but it IS Important to recogmze how 
generally it IS accepted that copynght deCISions should be made mdependently of any judgment 
as to the aesthetic merits of the work at Issue. See also Jones, Factual Compilation and the 
Second Circuit, 52 BROOKLYN L. REv 679, 687 (1986) (author criticIzes Second Circuit opmlOns 
whIch conSider factual compilations copynghtable only if the author has exercised selectivity m 
choosmg data or arranged the data distinctively because author clrums that such a test reqUires 
qualitative judgments that conflict with established pnnclples of copynght law); cf. Note, 
Problems, supra note 13, at 403 (author argues that copynght protection could be derued to 
obscene works without Violating the copyright's nondiscnnunation pnnclple because that pnnclple 
IS based on a deCISion not to reqUire aesthetic merit as a prereqUisite to copynght; author 
argues courts are confusmg "bad art" with "obscenity" and says that law could deny protection 
to obscene works without denYing protection to "bad art" because the two deternunations are 
so different); see also Samuelson, CaNTU ReVISited: The Case Agamst CopYrlght Protection 
for Computer Programs m Machme-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 749 (author argues 
that BlelStem pnnclple was taken too far m usmg it to justify copynghts on computer programs 
m machIne-readable form because BlelStem does not stand for copyright protection bemg 
extended to any work, but, rather, that copynghts should be granted to those works that have 
some "nonfunctional aesthetic, mformational or entertrurung qualities whIch are commurucated 
to a human audience" without regard for the quality of that work). 
92. See Cohen, Maskmg COPYrlght DeclS/onmakmg: The Meamnglessness of Substantial 
Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv 719, 720-22 (1987). 
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m analyzmg an infnngement chum IS determImng whether the defendant 
saw, or had an opportunity to see, the protected work.93 
If access can be established, the court must then determIne if the allegedly 
mfnngmg work IS substantially sImilar to the copyrIghted work. The preCIse 
mearung of "substantial SImilarity" IS not at all clear because courts have 
used varyIng standards to determIne whether the SImilarity IS substantial.94 
One indispensable corollary of that rule IS that the substantial SImilarity 
must be m the protectable "expressIon" and not Just m the underlYIng 
"ideas" of the two works. :A work that copIes only "ideas" and not the 
way those Ideas are expressed does not mfnnge the COPYrIght because only 
"expressIon" IS protected by COPYrIght. "Ideas" are conSIdered to be m the 
public domam.9s 
93. See, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (there must be eVIdence 
suffiCIent to mfer that there was a reasonable possibility that defendant had access to plruntiff's 
work); Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (eVIdence of opportunity 
to see protected work IS suffiCIent to establish access), aff'd, 360 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1966); 
Schwarz v. Uruversal Pictures Co., 85 F Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1945) (access not established if 
no proof that protected work was actually seen by defendant); see also 3 M. NIMMER & D. 
NIMMER, supra note 18, § 13.02[A] (argwng that it IS more just to reqUIre a plruntiff to prove 
only that a defendant had the opportunity to see the protected work rather than that a defendant 
actually did see it). 
94. See generally Cohen, supra note 92. 
95. In the 1976 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988), Congress made trus pnnciple part of the 
statutory law by excluding from-the subject matter of copynght "any Idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, pnnciple, or discovery."; see also Mazer v. Stem, 347 
U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (copynght extends to particular form of plruntiff's statuettes, but not to 
Idea of usmg statuette of human figures as lamp base); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 
(1879) (copynght protects author's explanation of bookkeepmg method, but not method itself); 
Nichols v. Uruversal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (copynght on play does 
not extend to basIC Idea of lovers of different backgrounds and parental disapproval of theIr 
relationslup), cert. demed, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). The courts have used different procedures to 
deternune if two works are substantially sunilar only In Ideas or also m expressIon. In some 
cases the courts fIrst define the unprotected Idea and then conSIder the nature of the SImilarities 
between the two works. See, e.g., MatteI, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l, 724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (idea of superhuman muscleman defined before expressIon of toys compared); Eden 
Toys, Inc. v. Marshall-Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1982) (idea of snowman defined 
before considenng SImilarities m parties' expressIOn of that Idea In toys); Herbert Rosenthal 
Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpaklan, 446 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1971) (idea of jewel-encrusted bee 
pm defined before expresSIon In jewelry compared). In other cases the courts never address thIS 
Issue directly, but once finding access SImply go on to compare the works to determme if they 
are substantially smillar. In these cases the courts seem to assume that the smillarities are m 
matters of expresSIOn. See, e.g., Kenbrooke Fabncs, Inc. v. Holland Fabncs, Inc., 602 F SUpp. 
151, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (no diScussIon of idea-expression pnnciple In companng fabnc desIgnS); 
Custom Decor, Inc. v. Nautical Crafts Inc., 502 F Supp. 154, 157 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (two 
sculptures of duck heads conSIdered substantially smillar without any conSIderation of the 
possibility that the Idea of a duck dictates some smillarities m expressIon). 
In the Ninth Circuit, the courts follow the procedures outlined m Sid & Marty Krofft 
TelevlSlon Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). In that case the 
court ruled that. after deternurung access, a court should engage m a two-step analYSIS to 
deternune substantial smillarity. First, the court should compare the Ideas In the two works to 
see if they are substantially sunilar, usmg an extnnsIc, analytIC approach to do so. Then, if the 
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Thus, wIthin any cOPYrIghted work, a line IS drawn between those elements 
that the cOPYrIght protects, the "expreSSIOn," and those elements that the 
copYrIght does not protect, the "ideas." In order to understand and evaluate 
the scope of a cOPYrIght owner's Interest m a cOPYrIghted work, it IS therefore 
necessary to determme where courts draw the line between the protected 
"expresSIOn" and the unprotected "ideas." A reVIew of the philosophIcal 
roots and the hIStOrICal development of thIS doctrme reveals why courts 
applYing thIS doctrme today follow an approach that necessarily Implicates 
the courts In artIstIc evaluatIOn of the works at Issue. 
1. The Roots of the Idea-ExpressIon DIchotomy 
The VIew that the "expreSSIOn" m a work of art can be distingUIshed 
from the "ideas" it expresses can be traced to Plato. For Plato, all art was 
sImply the Imitation of Ideas. There were two levels of such ImitatIOn: the 
production of actual physIcal objects and the production of Images. Both 
levels of ImitatIOn, however, were lower forms of reality than the true essence 
of the object, the "Idea" or "Form." The artist or artisan who trIed to 
Imitate thIS "Idea" either by makmg an Image of it or by makmg the actual 
object, could never, In Plato's VIew, truly capture that essence, but only 
Imitate It on a lower level of reality 96 ArIstotle also distingUIshed the artIst's 
work from the Ideas it reflected. ArIstotle believed that the artISt or poet 
should attempt to Imitate the unIversal prmcIples that eXIst m nature and In 
human nature In order to educate socIety about these truths.97 Thus, a work 
Ideas are substantially similar, the court should compare the similarities In expreSSIOn, uSing an 
IntnnslC, non-analytic approach to determine if the defendant took "so much of what IS pleasing 
to the audience" to be held liable. Id. at 1164-65. As applied, the Krafft test has often led 
courts to label as "ideas" elements of the works that others would consider "expressIOn" In 
order to be able to compare those elements analytically. Compare Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 
F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1984) (court compared as "ideas" the basic subject of alien 
stranded on earth and the sequence of events, dialogue, characters and mood of works to find 
no substantial similarity In "ideas"), cert. demed, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985), with Uruversal City 
Studio v. J.A.R. Sales, Inc., 1982 COPYright L. Rep. (CCH) 1 25,460 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (in 
companng E. T. character with doll made by defendant, court conSidered only the basic subject 
of an alien character as "ideas" and found substantial similarity In "ideas" of two works). 
Thus, the Krafft approach has led to even greater confusIOn about the distinction between an 
Idea and Its expressIOn. The court, moreover, does not explain why the works need to be 
substantially similar In Ideas if Ideas themselves are not copynghtable. See Cohen, supra note 
92, at 753-57. See generally Samuels, The Idea-expressIon Dichotomy In Copynght Law, 56 
TENN. L. REv. 321, 410-23 (1989) (author describes courts' tendencies to confuse Idea-expresslOn 
and substantial similanty tests). 
96. Plato used the example of a couch and defined the three levels as the Idea of the couch 
as a uruversal reality, the phYSIcal object of a particular couch made by the craftsman and the 
painting of the couch's Image by the artist. PLATO, THE REpUBUC, supra note 55, at 277-81 
Plato then wrote that "the mImetic art IS far removed from the truth, and thiS, it seems, It IS 
the reason why It can produce everything, because It touches or lays hold of only a small part 
of the object and that a phantom " [d. at 281. 
97 See supra note 55 and accompanYing text. 
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of art was vlewed as distinct from a transcendental essence that could not 
be captured or possessed but only nnitated; m other words, what the artist 
or author expressed was consldered distinct from the underlying ldea. 
These classlcal Vlews on the distinction between an "idea" and its "ex-
pression" had conSlderable mfluence m the early modem penod although 
the deflnition of "idea" was modifled. For example, John Locke's discusslon 
of ideas reflects tills distinction. For Locke, "idea" did not refer to some 
absolute reality as it did for Plato, but to "the Object of the Understanding 
when a Man tillnks ... or whatever it lS, willch the Mind can be employ'd 
about m tillnkmg .. . "98 These ideas were not lnnate, but denved from 
expenence and reflection. Locke, however, reflected Plato's lnfluence by 
distingulshing those ldeas that eXlst m people's mmd from the words and 
language people use to express them. Locke believed that ldeas must eXlst 
before there'is a word that will become a Slgn for the ldea, and that words 
are only symbols used to commumcate ldeas to another. As such, that 
symbol's effectiveness lS limited by the extent to willch it slgnifles the same 
ldea to the listener as it does to the speaker. UnderlYing tills discusslon lS 
Locke's distinction between the conceptual, mtangible ldea and the words 
and symbols people use m attempting to express those ldeas.99 Thus, for 
Locke, mtangible, conceptual ldeas were distingmshed from the tangible, 
perceptible expreSSlOn; every work of art reflected the artist's attempt to 
convey an mtangible, essential ldea through some perceptible form of ex-
presslon. 
Tills conception of the nature of the creative process seemed to underlie 
copynght Junsprudence dunng the nineteenth century. Dunng the mneteenth 
century and up through the flrst twenty years of the twentieth century, the 
courts did not focus on a distinction between an "idea" and its "expresslon" 
for purposes of determlmng copynght mfringement. Instead, the criticallssue 
for courts determimng copyright mfnngement was whether the defendant 
had engaged m mdependent creation. IOO Tills can be explruned m part by the 
98. J. LOCKE, EssAy ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, Book I, ch. I, § 8, at 47 (P Nittitch ed. 
1975) (4th ed. 1700). 
99. Id. at Book II, ch. I, §§ 1-9, at 104-08; Book III, ch. I, §§ 2-6, at 402-04; Book III, 
ch. II-X, at 404-38; see also D. HOME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (1739) (L. Selby-Bigge 
ed. 1965). See generally M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 55, at 173-75; D. O'CONNOR, JOHN LOCKE 
60-62, 123-32 (1967); R. WOOLHOUSE, LoCKE 45-55 (1983); Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellec-
tual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 311-12 (1988). The VIews of other neoclassIcal writers, such 
as S. JOHNSON, supra note 56, and J. REYNOLDS, supra note 57, reflect the VIew that art, by' 
llnitating nature, conveys the Ideas of beauty and truth. 
100. E.g., Daly v. Palmer, 6 F Cas. 1132, 1138 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552) ("The true 
test of whether there IS a pIracy or not, IS to ascertam whether there IS a servile or evasIve 
Imitation of the plamtiffs work, or whether there IS a bona fide onglnal compilation, made 
up from common matenals and common sources "); Green v. Bishop, 10 F Cas. 1128, 
1134 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5763) ("[f]he mam question IS, whether the author of the work 
alleged to be a pIracy has resorted to the onglnal sources alike open to him and to all wnters, 
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more limited definition of "idea" that was applied In copynght cases at tills 
time. 
For example, In Holmes v Hurst, 101 In discussmg the general nature of 
copynght In a case mvolvIng publication without notice, the Supreme Court 
observed In dictum: 
The nght thus secured by the copynght act IS not a nght to the use of 
certrun words, because they are the common property of the human race, 
and are as little susceptible of pnvate appropnation as rur or sunlight; 
nor IS it the nght to Ideas alone, since In the absence oj means oj 
communicating them they are oj value to no one but the author But 
the nght IS to that arrangement of words whIch the author has selected 
to express hIs Ideas. '02 
or whether he has adopted and used the plan of the work which it IS alleged he has 
mfnnged "). As late as 1924, Judge Learned Hand wrote m Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 
298 F 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), that copynght mfnngement will eXist if one COpies a plot from an 
author who had mdependently created that plot, even though that same plot nught have been 
used m an earlier work. If the author's contribution was ongInai to that author, even though 
it might be conSidered an "idea," it was protected by, the copynght. Id. at 150. Judge Hand 
reasoned: 
[O]ngInaiity IS alone the test of validity. Any subsequent person IS, of course, 
free to use all works In the public domaIn as sources for hIs compositions. No 
later work, though ongInal, can take that from hIm. But there IS no reason m 
Justice or In law why he should not be compelled to resort to the earlier works 
themselves, or why he should be free to use the composition of another, who 
lumself has not borrowed. 
Id., cf. Bachman v. Belasco, 224 F 817, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (where defendant had no access 
to plaIntiff's protected work and wrote play smillar to plaIntiff's, USIng a common source, no 
mfnngement was found, smce creating a smillar work IS permitted, "prOVided one gets the Idea 
from the common source, not from the copynghted play"); Johnson v. Donaldson, 3 F 22, 
24 (S.D.N.Y. 1880) (although "[a]n artist cannot acquire such an exclusive nght to the conception 
embodied and expressed m Ius picture as to preclude others from the exercise of theIr own 
creative genIus," those others are only spared liability if their works were mdependently created). 
Thus, even those elements such as old dramatic plots wluch courts today would conSider 
unprotectable "ideas" were conSidered, to some extent, protectable and could not be copied 
from a protected work. 
101. 174 U.S. 82 (1899). Interestingly, the unsuccessful plaIntiff In thIs case was Dr. Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Sr., Justice Holmes' father. Holmes, Sr., lost the case as a result of the 
court's finding that he had published hIs work without notice, t1!ereby forfeiting hIs copynght 
protection. It IS possible to speculate that Justice Holmes' essentially pro-copynght VIews may 
be a reflection of hIs father's Interests and expenences. See, for example, Holmes' OpinIOns m 
Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917) (plaYIng copynghted musIc m a restaurant IS 
performmg work "for profit" and thus a VIOlation of copynght owner's nghts); Kalem Co. v. 
Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) (transfonmng book Into mOVIe IS a VIolation of copynght 
owner's nght to dramatize the work); White-Smith MUSIC Publislung Co. v. Apollo' Co., 209 
U.S. 1 (1908) (Holmes, J., concurrmg) (copynght should not be limited to particular format m 
which work appears, but should extend to Intangible conceptuaIization); and United Dictionary 
Co. v. G. & C. Memam Co., 208 U.S. 260 (1908) (publication of work In England without 
Amencan copynght notice did not forfeit copynght In United States). But see Lows Dejonge 
& Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 235 U.S. 33 (1914) (each reproduction of design on gift wrap 
reqwred a separate notice of copynght; one notice per sheet was Inadequate). 
102. Id. at 86 (emphasiS added); see also Johnson v. Donaldson, 3 F 22, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1880) 
("A copynght secures the propnetor agamst the copYIng, by others, of the ongInai work, but 
does not confer upon hIm a monopoly m the mtellectual conception whIch it expresses. "). 
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Thus, In tlus court's view an idea was an Intangible, unexpressed concept 
that eXIsted only In the author's mInd, a VIew remInIscent of Locke. The 
copynght only protected the specific arrangement of words selected by the 
author to express that Idea. 
Similarly, In White-Smith MusIc Publishmg Co. v. Apollo CO.,103 the 
Supreme Court In 1907 held that a perforated roll used to create the sounds 
of a mUSIcal composition when placed In a player piano did not InfrInge the 
copyright in the underlYIng mUSIcal composition because: 
A musical composition IS an Intellectual creation whIch first eXIsts In the 
mInd of the composer; he may play it for the first time upon an 
Instrument. It IS not susceptible of beIng copIed until it has been put In 
a form whIch others can see and read. The statute has not proVided for 
the protection of the mtellectual conception apart from the thmg pro-
duced, however meritonous such conception may be, but has provIded 
for the malang and filing of a tangible thIng, agaInst the publication and 
duplication of whIch it IS the purpose of the statute to protect the 
composer .104 
Here agam, the noncopynghtable "idea" was the pure conceptualization not 
eXIsting In tangible form; the copynght only protected the particular form 
In wluch that Idea was expressed. lOS Once that Idea was expressed m a 
particular form or format, the copynght prohibited copYIng of the form or 
, format In which that Idea was expressed. In White-Smith, however, because 
a different medium was used, it was found that "expressIOn" had not been 
copIed, but that only the unprotected "idea" had been taken. l ()6 
103. 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
104. Id. at 17 (emphasIs added). 
105. See Hoplans, Ideas, Their Time Has Come: An Argument and A Proposal jor Copy-
Tlghting Ideas, 46 ALB. L. REv. 443, 452 (1982) ("The Idea underlymg the words IS srud to be 
analogous to the elements of matter, and such elements are srud to eXIst m the mmd alone and 
no property mterest can be c1rumed m them."). Hoplans recognIZed that m practice thIS 
definition was not applied and that "ideas" were often blended with "expressIOn" m detemurung 
copynght protection, resulting m some limited protection of Ideas. HopkIns would go further 
than thIs and proVIde copynght protection to Ideas themselves, defined by hIm to mclude "those 
thIngs that mdiVIduals denve from their expenence whIch have utility and are marketable m 
the world of commerce." Id. at 452 n.50. ThIs IS obVIously a far more restncted definition of 
"idea" than generally used m copynght matters, where "ideas" mclude such non-utilitanan 
items as literary plots and the subject matter of pruntings. Within the limited definition of 
"ideas" that he proposes, however, Hopkms would have Congress amend the copynght law to 
extend protection to them, arguIng that the traditIonal reluctance to protect Ideas was appropnate 
m an agranan pre-mdustnal socIety, but not m our modem economy where skills, servIces and 
mtangibles are Important assets. Although Hoplans' concern with the market value of Ideas IS 
not a pnmary concern m thIs Article, hIs VIew does reflect the modem tendency to treat Ideas 
and expressIOn as mdistinguIshable. 
106. The outcome m White-Smith was consIstent with the statutory law m effect at the time. 
Pnor to the 1909 Act, the copynght statutes proVIded only very limited protection agrunst 
transformation of a copynghted work mto a different medium. The first copynght statute, Act 
of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831), only proVIded to the authors of "any 
map, chart, book or books" <the sole nghts of "pnnting, repnnting, publishIng and vending" 
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Thus, In these caseslO7 copynght Junsprudence defined "ideas" and "ex-
pressIon" In ways that reflected a classIcal conceptIOn of the nature of the 
such works, ld. at § 1; protection was extended to pnnts 10 1802, but the protection was still 
limited to the nghts described 10 the 1790 statute, see Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 
Stat. 171. Musical compositions were added to the list of protectable works 10 Act of Feb. 3, 
1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, but there was no exclusive nght of performance provided to the 
copynght of such works, only the limited nghts of prmting, repnnting, publishmg and vending. 
These limited nghts did not even protect the author agaInst a translation of a literary work, as 
Hamet Beecher Stowe discovered 10 1853 when she was unsuccessful 10 sumg the author of a 
German translation of her book, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN. The court reasoned that the "only 
property which the law gives to [the copyright owner] IS the exclusive nght to multiply 
copies of that particular combmation of characters which exhibits to the eyes of another the 
Ideas mtended to be conveyed." Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F Cas. 201, 206-07 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) 
(No. 13,514). When those Ideas were translated by another mto a different language, that 
"particular combmation of characters" had not been copied so no Violation of the copynght 
had occurred. "A translation may, 10 loose phraseology, be called a transcnpt or copy of her 
thoughts or conceptions, but 10 no correct sense can it be called a copy of her- book." Id. at 
208. 
Justice Holmes concurred 10 the outcome 10 White-Smith on these statutory grounds, but he 
expressed senous doubts about the Wisdom of a statute that so narrowly defined the limits of 
copynght protection. 
One would expect the proteCtion to be coextensive not only with the mventlon, 
wluch, though free to all, only one had the ability to achieve, but with the 
possibility of reproducmg the result which gives to the mvention its meamng and 
worth. A mUSical composition IS a rational collocation of sounds apart from 
concepts, reduced to a tangible expressIOn from which the collocation can be 
reproduced either With or Without continuous human mtervention. On pnnclple 
anythmg that mechamcally reproduces that collocation of sounds ought to be held 
a copy 
209 U.S. at 19-20 (Holmes, J., concurrIng). Holmes' view that copyright should protect more 
than the literal representation of the author's Ideas 10 a specific tangible form IS also reflected 
10 hiS majority opmlOn 10 Kalem, 222 U.S. 55, 10 wluch the court found that the copynght on 
a book was mfnnged by one who used ItS story 10 a motion picture. See mfra notes 112-14 
and accompanymg text. 
107. Another mfluential case IS the Supreme Court's 1879 deCISion 10 Baker v. Selden, 101 
U.S. 99 (1879). In ruling that blank account books could not be protected by copynght, the 
court reasoned that copyright protection did not extend to the system or method of bookkeepmg 
which the plaIntiff's book was wntten to illustrate, and that smce this system could not be 
used without usmg the arrangement of lines and headings that plamtiff provided 10 hiS book, 
plaIntiff could not claIm copynght 10 those arrangements smce to do so would grant plaIntiff 
a monopoly on the system as well. Id. at 103-04. The case IS therefore often cited for the 
proposition that copynght does not protect Ideas. E.g., Mazer v. Stem, 347 U.S. 201, 217 
(1954); Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986), 
cert. demed, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th 
Cir. 1986); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1250 (3d Cir. 
1983), cert. demed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). See generally SAMUELS, supra note 95, at 326-30. The 
Court's explanation for its conclUSIOn that copyright did not extend to the underlymg system 
IS mterestmg, however, for its limited scope: "To give to the author of the book an exclUSive 
property 10 the art described therem, when no exammatlon of ItS novelty has ever been officially 
made, would be a surpnse and a fraud upon the public. That IS the provmce of letters-patent, 
not of copynght." Baker, 101 U.S. at 102. The Court IS thus not basmg Its reasonmg on a 
view that Ideas by their very nature belong 10 the public domaIn, but, rather, on the differentiated 
treatment mtended by Congress 10 enactmg the patent and copynght statutes. Moreover, the 
kmd of "idea" that the Court considered outside the scope of copyright IS limited 10 this case 
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creative process m whtch an artist attempted to convey an mtangible "idea" 
through perceptible forms of expression, such as words or symbols. Copynght 
only protected those specific perceptible words and symbols; anyone was 
free to use theIr own words and symbols, theIr own "expreSSIOn," to convey 
the underlymg "ideas," as long as they did so mdependently. Because the 
"ideas" eXIsted m the abstract, they were not part of the creator's contn-
bution to the work and could be used by anyone. Only the particular forms 
of expreSSIOn that had been contributed by that creator could be protected 
agamst mfrmgement. 
2. Romantic and Modem Views of "Idea" and "Expression" 
and Their Impact on Copynght Law 
The clasSICal conception of the creative process and its distinction between 
an Idea and its expressIon was challenged dunng the mneteenth century by 
art and literary critics and philosophers. As discussed prevIously, the Ro-
mantic VIew changed the way art and artists were perceIved. lOS Instead of 
concelVlng of art as Imitating umversal truths and Ideas, the creation of art 
was seen as a process that reflected the emotions and personality of the 
mdivIdual artist. In addition, art was seen as a symbol of the human 
unconscIous. 109 \ 
To the extent that copynght Junsprudence had relied on the claSSIcal 
distmction between an "idea" and its "expressIOn," that Junsprudence was 
to sCientific, mechanical or utilitanan processes and Inventions, not the more general notion of 
"idea" used In more current copynght opInions to Include dramatic plots or the subject of 
plctonal illustrations. One author has concluded that In fact the Idea·expresslon dichotomy 
should only be applied to works such as those at Issue In Baker. Note, Derivative Works and 
the Protection oj Ideas, 14 GA. L. REv. 794 (1980). ThiS author distingUishes practical writings, 
which convey Information or explain systems or methods, from artistic writings that are valued 
for their creative effort. The author reasons that the separation of an Idea from its expression 
makes sense with practical writings "[s]ince the Ideas embodied In practical wntIngs are subject 
to practical application, [and] the rIght to use the Idea means the nght to employ It In actual 
practice." Id. at 802. The author further argues that the application of thiS distinction to artistic 
WrIting does not work and POints to a number of cases reversed on appeal on the Issue of what 
IS Idea and" what IS expressIOn as eVidence to demonstrate the failure of thIs doctnne. Id. at 
804-09. 
108. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanYing text. 
109. Edward LUCie-Smith drew a distinction between the use of symbols as allegory In 
Renaissance and post-Renaissance art and the use of symbols In the second half of the nineteenth 
century. 
The theOrIsts of the Symbolist Movement [of the nineteenth century] recognized 
that the symbol could be something which eXisted In its own nght, diffusmg a 
mystenous Influence around itself, and affecting the whole context In which It 
was placed. In traditional allegory, on the other hand, it was assumed that 
what the symbol stood for was somethIng rationally deCided In advance; symbolic 
objects were therefore regarded Simply as units of language. 
E. LUCIE-SMITII, SYMBOLIST ART 16-18 (1972). 
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threatened with obsolescence. If art was no longer vIewed as the formal 
expreSSIOn of fundamental, abstract Ideas, but rather as the expressIOn of 
the mdivIdual feelings of the partIcular artist, then the VIew that copynght 
should protect only the author's specific way of expressmg the Ideas, but 
not those fundamental, abstract Ideas themselves, had lost its philosophIcal 
basIS. According to the Romantic VIew, the entire work could be consIdered 
to reflect the mdivIdual personality of the artist. Therefore, more than Just 
the partIcular arrangement of words or VISUal charactenstIcs should be 
protected because the work as a whole reflected the emotIons and mdivIdual 
contributIons of the artist. 
By the mIddle of the runeteenth century, the copynght statutes began to 
reflect a broader VIew of the creative process, as seen m the copyrIght statutes 
of 1856, 1870 and 1891, m whIch Congress both enlarged the category of 
works eligible for protection and expanded the nghts prOVIded to copynght 
owners yo The real shift m the nature of the protection prOVIded to copynght 
owners, however, was first clearly manifested m the 1909 Act, m whIch 
Congress recogruzed explicitly that an author had a cogruzable clrum of 
copynght mfnngement even when the purported mfrmger had transformed 
the work mto a different medium. I II The copynght owner now could recover 
110. In 1856, Congress slowly began to enlarge the nature of the copynght owner's nghts. 
In that year Congress expanded the scope of copyrIght to mclude dramatic compositions and 
prOVIded the owner of the copynght m such works with the "sole nght also to act, perform, 
or represent the same, or cause It to be acted, performed, or represented, on any stage or 
public place " Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138. Owners of copynghts mother 
works were not gIven any additional nghts, however, so that a dramatization or translation of 
a book would still not constitute mfnngement. In 1870, Congress added many new categones 
of works eligible for copynght, mcluding pamtings, drawmgs and statues, and prOVIded the 
owners with the sole rIghts of "prmting, reprInting, publishIng, completing, cOPYIng, executing, 
finIshmg, and vending the same; and m the case of a dramatic composition, of publicly 
performmg or representmg" it, and for the first time, prOVIded that "authors may reserve the 
nght to dramatize or to translate theIr works." Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 
Stat. 198, 212. ThIS rIght to dramatize or translate a literary work did not become an 
automatically-granted exclUSIve nght until 1891. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1107. 
Owners of the COPYrIght m mUSIcal compositions were finally granted the nght of public 
performance m 1897. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (amending Title 60, ch. 3, sec. 
4966 of the ReVIsed Statutes). Thus, by the end of the nIneteenth century, Congress was 
begmnIng to realize that an author needed to be protected agaInst more than the literal copYIng 
of the phYSIcal format m whIch the work appeared, but It was not until the 1909 Act that 
Congress enacted a statute that more fully prOVIded copynght owners with nghts agaInst those 
who transformed theIr works mto different media. See mfra note 111. 
111. The 1909 Act prOVIded the copynght owner with the exclUSIve nght to transform the 
protected work mto different formats, for example, to dramatize a nondramatlc work and to 
translate a literary work or "to make any other versIOn thereof," Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 
320, § l(b), 35 Stat. 1175 (emphaSIS added), and with the rIght to perform works publicly; 
dramatic works whether for profit or not and mUSIcal and nondramatlc works if for profit. Id. 
at §§ I(d), (e). The 1909 Act also specifically addressed the Issue raIsed m White-Smith, 209 
U.S. 1, and prOVIded m § I(e) that the owner of the copynght m a musIcal composition had 
the exclUSIve rIght to "make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody of it m any 
system of notation or any form of record m whIch the thought of an author may be recorded 
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not only agaInst one who used the particular words or vIsual characterIstics 
used In the copynghted work, but also agaInst one who took some elements 
of the copynghted work and created a work that transformed those elements 
in some way, whether by changes In medium, fonnat or otherwIse. 
The expanSIon In the scope of copynght IS eVIdent In some of the first 
cases In whIch authors recovered agaInst defendants who transformed the 
copynghted work Into a different medium. In Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 112 
a case InvolVIng a defendant who had made a motion pIcture of the 
copynghted book Ben Hur, Justice Holmes upheld a finding of InfrIngement 
based on the author's exclusIve rIght to dramatize hIs own work. 1I3 Justice 
Holmes specifically rejected the defendant's argument that to find mfrInge-
ment here would extend copynght to "ideas" as distingUIshed from "ex-
pressIOn," obserVIng that "there IS no attempt to make a monopoly of the 
Ideas expressed."114 "ExpressIon" was clearly no longer consIdered limited 
to the literal elements of the copynghted work. ThIS decIsIon laId the 
groundwork for subsequent cases In whIch a plaIntiff claImed that a film 
was an infrIngement of the expreSSIon In a literary work, In spite of the 
change In mediumYs Similarly, thIS broader conception of the scope of 
copyright was also applied ·to copyrighted VISUal works that were transformed 
and from wInch it may be read or reproduced " Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b), 35 
Stat. 1075 (emphasiS added). Thus, m the 1909 Act, Congress began to recogruze that copynght 
protected the conceptual elements of expressIOn and that tIns transformation mto a different 
medium or format could mfnnge that copynght. See generally Collins, Some Obsolescent 
Doctrmes of the Law of CopYright, 1 S. CAL. L. REv. 127, 139 (1928) (the author chumed m 
1928 that the copynght pnnclple that Ideas were not copynghtable was obsolete because based 
on the pnor law with its limited protectIOn of only literal expressIOn; author argued that new, 
more liberal statute did 10 fact protect Ideas by protecting copynght owner against dramatiza-
tions, translations and abndgments). 
The 1976 Act also specifically recogruzed that the copynght owner has the exclusive nght to 
"prepare denvative works based upon the copynghted work." 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988). A 
"denvative work" IS defined as "a work based upon one or more preeXisting works, such as 
a translation, mUSical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture verSIOn, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abndgment, condensation, or any other form m which a work may 
be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Thus, under current law the 
copynght IS 10fnnged whenever someone takes the copynghted expressIOn and transforms It 
mto a different medium 10 a way that IS conSidered substantially Similar to the cOPYrighted 
work. See, e.g., Horgan v. Macmillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986) (still photographs of 
a ballet could be conSidered denvative work mfrIngmg cOPYright 10 choreography of the ballet, 
if substantially Similar). This broad right to control denvatlve works has been seen as eVidence 
that copynght does m fact protect Ideas, at least 10 artistic works. See Note, supra note 107, 
at 809-12. 
112. 222 U.S. 55 (1911). 
113. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1107. 
114. Kalem, 222 U.S. at 63. 
115. E.g., International Film Servo v. Affiliated Distribs., 283 F 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); see 
also Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.), cert. dismISSed, 296 U.S. 669 (1933); 
Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126 (S.D. Cal. 1927) (courts recogruzed the 
potential for a film to mfrInge the copyright m a literary work, although they did not find 
suffiCient eVidence to support a finding of mfrIngement m these particular cases). 
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by the defendant. In King Features Syndicate v Flelscher,116 the court held 
that makIng a three-dimensIOnal toy based on a copynghted cartoon character 
constituted Infnngement In spIte of the change In medium.117 
Thus, we have a recognitIOn that what IS protected by the copynght IS 
not limited to the partIcular form or medium or the literal words or VISUal 
features, but that copynght protects elements of a work that are Intangible 
and conceptual. That IS, to use the example at Issue In White-Smith, a 
mUSIcal composition IS protected even when it IS embodied In many different 
forms and formats: sheet mUSIC, plano rolls, records, tapes and compact 
discs. What IS protected IS not only the phYSIcal, tangible item whIch can 
produce that mUSIcal composition, but the mUSIcal sounds themselves. Sim-
ilarly, with VISUal art works and literary works what IS protected IS not only 
the preCIse format or medium used to display the art work or the specific 
words WIth whIch a story IS told, but also the conceptual and Intangible 
elements: the details and structure of that art work or literary work. Thus, 
the copynght owner now could recover' for InfrIngement In cases where 
before the courts would have found that only Ideas, but not expreSSIOn, had 
been copIed. ThIS new willingness to allow the creator to protect not only 
the specific arrangement of words or the partIcular selection of VISUal 
charactenstlcs may reflect the RomantIc VIew of the creatIve process as 
orgamc and emotIonal, and of the whole work as a reflection of the 
contributions of the IndiVIdual artlst. lls 
In the cases decIded after these statutory changes were made In 1909, a 
cntical determInatIon became whether the elements of the copynghted work 
that had been copIed or transformed by the alleged InfrInger Into the new 
work were elements of the copynghted work that the copyrIght, In fact, 
protected. In decIding these cases, the courts continued to use the labels 
"idea" to refer to features of a work that the defendant could use without 
liability and "expressIOn" to refer to those features that, if copIed, could 
result In liability For example, In 1913, the distnct court In Eichel v 
Marcm 119 reasoned that because free access to "ideas" IS cntlcal to the 
development of creatIve works, a playwnght who copIed a plot from a 
copynghted work did not InfrInge the cOPYright as long as he or she did 
not take the new embellishments added to the plot. The court reasoned: 
116. 299 F 533 (2d Cir. 1924). 
117 Id. at 53S. 
lIS. See Umbrelt, supra note 35, at 947-51 (author ties expansIOn of cOPYright to "derived 
products" to change to Romantic vIew of literature); cj. Libott, Round the Prrckly Pear: The 
Idea-expressIon Fallacy In a Mass Communications World, 14 UCLA L. REv 735, 743-47 
(1967) (author tracks expansIOn In copYright protection from protecting only literal COPYIng to 
protecting works when transformed Into different media, attributing that expansIOn to the 
grOWing market for secondary uses of literary works). 
119. 241 F 404 (S.D.N.Y 1913). 
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If an author, by ongmating a new arrangement and form of expressIOn 
of certaIn Ideas or conceptions, could withdraw these Ideas or conceptions 
from the stock of matenals to be used by other authors, each copynght 
would narrow the field of thought open for development and exploitation, 
and SCIence, poetry, narrative, and dramatic fiction and other branches 
of literature would be hIndered by copynght, mstead of bemg promoted. l20 
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Thus, the basIC plot itself was an "idea" whIch the copynght did not prevent 
others from using m creating theIr own works. The embellishments on the 
plot, however, were "expressIon." Although the focus was no longer on 
"expression" as tangible and "ideas" as mtangible, as it had been, for 
example, m Hurst,12I the courts continued to use the labels "idea" to refer 
to unprotected features and "expression" to refer to protected features. l22 
The continued use of the terms "idea" and "expressIon" to define the 
scope of copyright in works of art became mcreasmgly out of step with 
evolving VIews of the creative process. Benedetto Croce, for example, wrote 
in the early twentieth century that artistic creation is an mtuitive process, 
not an mtellectual one, and that the essence of artistic activity IS not the 
production of an external phYSICal object, but an mternalized aesthetic 
synthesIs of ImpreSSIons and sensations. l23 In the 1930s, John Dewey wrote 
that art IS a reflection of and outgrowth of the expenence of the artist 
mteracting with the matenals used to make the art object. Dewey claImed 
that during thIs orgaruc, creative expenence, the artist's emotions and Ideas 
are transformed and expressed as the artist works with the phYSICal matenals. 
Thus, for Dewey there was no distinction between an artist's abstract Idea 
and the ultimate expression; rather, the work of art reflected the livmg 
expenence of the artist who created the work.124 
120. [d. at 408 (emphasiS added). 
121. 174 U.S. at 86. 
122. In Roe-Lawton, for example, the court found no Infnngement of the plaintiff's wild 
horse stones by the defendant's mm. Although the same theme was used In both works, the 
court found no substantial Identity In the protected details In the scenes and specific plot 
inCidents and concluded that those s1ffiilantles that did eXIst "belong to the character of natural 
and expected happemngs, consldenng the normal action of ammals and persons placed as the 
characters are In the enVironment In whIch we find them." Roe-Lawton, 18 F.2d at 127. 
Similarly, In Guthne v. Curlett, 36 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1929), the court held that copynght 
protection for a consolidated freight tariff did not cover the basiC Idea of such an Index, but 
only the particular ways In whIch the plaintiff had expressed that Idea that were not necessitated 
by the nature of the Idea. On the other hand, In Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 
F.2d 131 (8th Cir.), cert; demed, 287 U.S. 666 (1932), the court found Infnngement of the 
plaintiff's copynghted advertisement because the defendant had not only taken the unprotected 
Ideas, but also had copied aspects of the work conSIdered expression: the illustrations, the 
language used and the arrangements of the matenal. 
123. B. CROCE, AEsnmnc AS SCIENCE OF EXPRESSION AND GENERAL LINGUISTIC 1~19 (D. 
AInslie trans. 1909); see H. OSBORNE, supra note 55, at 222-23. 
124. J. DEWEY, supra note 76, at 49-52, 56, 64-65. Dewey noted: 
The act of expressIOn that constitutes a work of art IS a construction In time, not 
an Instantaneous enusslOn. It means that the expressIOn of the self In and 
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These views have seen further development more recently In the work of 
conceptual artists, who create art that sometimes has no permanent form 
and In some cases does not eXIst In any form at all, other than In the 
documentatIOn used to describe it. Their belief that art need not have any 
form at all as long as the artist has a conceptIOn In mInd IS a blatant 
rejectIOn of the notion that a line can be drawn In any given work of art 
between the Idea and its expresslon. l2S Other contemporary schools of art, 
such as mInimalist art and found art, further illustrate the grOWIng tensIOn 
between contemporary art and the Idea-expressIOn dichotomy as expressed 
In the clasSical conception of art. 126 
In spite of these changes In the view of the creative process, courts have 
continued to apply the labels of "idea" and "expressIOn," resultIng In 
senous ambiguities In determInatIOns of InfrIngement. These ambiguities have 
left the door Wide open for declSlons based upon assessments of artistic 
value. 127 
through a medium, constituting the work of art, IS itself a prolonged Interaction 
of somethIng IssUIng from the self WIth objectIve conditions, a process In whIch 
both of them acqUIre a form and order they did not at first possess. 
Id. at 65 (emphasIS In ongInal). Additionally, he stated: 
The work IS artistic In the degree m whIch the two functions of transformation 
are effected by a smgle operation. As the prunter places pIgment upon the canvas, 
or Imagmes it placed there, hIS Ideas and feeling are also ordered. As the writer 
composes m hIs medium of words what he wants to say, hIS Idea takes on for 
hImself perceptible form. 
Id. at 75. 
125. Joseph Kosuth, one of the leading conceptual artists, rejected what he called the Formalist 
tradition In art that defined art on the basIS of form and structure, argumg that "[fjormalist 
cntIClsm IS no more than an analysIs of the phYSIcal attributes of particular objects that happen 
to eXIst m a morpholOgIcal context. But thIS doesn't add any knowledge (or facts) to our 
understanding of the nature or function of art." J. KOSUTH, Art After Philosophy, I and II, 
In IDEA ART: A CRrnCAL ANTHOLOGY 70, 79 (G. Battcock ed. 1973). Kosuth clrumed that the 
phYSIcal objects were InSIgnificant; what was valuable was what the art work contributed to the 
conception and definition of "art." Id. at 77-83. According to Kosuth, "[a]rt 'lives' through 
InfluenCIng other art, not by eXIsting as the phYSIcal resIdue of an artist's Ideas." Id. at 82. 
Advance Information about the concept of art and about an artist's concepts IS 
necessary to the apprecIation and understanding of contemporary art. Any and 
all of the phYSIcal attributes of contemporary works, if conSIdered separately 
and/or specifically, are Irrelevant to the art concept. The art concept must 
be conSIdered In its whole. 
Id. at 89. Based on thIS vIew of the purpose and nature of art, Kosuth and other conceptual 
artIStS, such as Robert Barry, Douglas Huebler and Lawrence WeIner, have created art whIch 
may be perceptible only through the documentation whIch describes it or not at all. See ROSE, 
Four InterVIews, Id. at 140-49; Jrumeson, The Importance of Bemg Conceptual, 45 J. AEsnnmcs 
& ART CRrnCISM 117-23 (1986). 
126. See, e.g., Fowkes, A Hegelian Critique of Found Art and Conceptual Art, 37 J. 
AEsTHETICS & ART CRrnCISM 157-68 (1978); Leepa, Mimmal Art and Pnmary Meamngs, In 
MINIMAL ART: A CRrncAL ANTHOLOGY 200-08 (G. Battcock ed. 1968). 
127 Others have recognIZed that there IS no objective way to distingUIsh an Idea from its 
expressIOn. Robert Yale Libott wrote that the Idea-expresslOn dichotomy IS "a semantic and 
hlstonc fallacy without mearungful applicatIon to the creative process, and that it results at best 
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A reVIew of some of the cases applymg the Idea-expressIOn dichotomy to 
works m the VISUal arts, that IS, plctonal, sculptural and graphic works, and 
m Judicial anomaly and at worst m substanual mjustice." Libott, supra note 118, at 736. 
Noting the mconslstent treatment by courts of plot and characters, sometimes as Ideas and 
sometimes as expression, Libott concluded that there IS no real definition of "idea" for copynght 
purposes, but only a label applied by a court "as a ready means of demonstrating the court's 
ad hoc deCISion that thIS plot, thIS theme, or these characters should not be granted the sanctuary 
of the copynght laws." Id. at 740 (emphasiS m ongmal). Libott also pomted to the Wide range 
m the way the word "idea" IS defined m leading dictionanes as an' indicatIon of why there IS 
no consistent application of that term by judges deCiding copynght cases. For the limited 
purposes of hiS diSCUSSion, Libott used a definition of "idea" as the "spme" of a dramatic 
work or "the continwng directional force or structure to wluch each of the sub (or sub-sub) 
components IS connected, and from wluch they radiate." Id. at 742. He then argued that as so 
defined, the pnnclple that Ideas are not copynghtable IS contrary to market realities where such 
Ideas are considered lughly valuable, as demonstrated by the example of teleVISion formats 
(written descnptions of the basiC framework of a proposed teleVISion senes). Id. at 755-61. 
After shOWing the weaknesses of alternative theones available under state law to protect such 
Ideas, Libott concludes that "not only the Idea-expresslon fallacy, but also the enUre concept 
of the non-protectability of Ideas [should] be excised from the law of copynght " Id. at 
769. 
Other commentators have also recogruzed thiS problem. Professor Reichman discusses how 
the courts use the Idea-expresslon pnnClple "in a heavy handed manner" to limit the scope of 
copynght protection m articles of mdustnal design by finding a "thm" level of expression and 
the cOPYIng of that expression by the purported mfnnger. Reichman, supra note 91, at 1234. 
In discussmg Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. KalpakIan, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971), a 
case wluch mvolved a jeweled bee pm, see mfra notes 133-39 and accompanYing text, Reichman 
suggested that "[t]lus court may have thought the design commonplace, m wluch case It was 
m part grappling With the problem of the degree of creaUve content." Reichman, supra note 
91, at 1234 n.476. Another author, focusmg on the protection prOVIded to commerCially valuable 
Ideas under state law, observed that the line drawn by such state law between Ideas conSidered 
unprotected because too general and abstract and those Ideas that were suffiCiently concrete 
and novel to receive protection was analogous to the line drawn by copynght law between 
"idea" and "expression." Note, Beyond the Realm of COPYright: Is There Legal Sanctuary for 
the Merchant of Ideas?, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 284 (1974). The author found that the location 
of t1us line was "incapable of exact deternnnation, and obfuscated by the deCISions wluch 
have been rendered m t1us area." Id. at 288. The author SaId that the mconslstency m results 
m two cases applYing t1us line to advertiSing Ideas was explaInable only by result-onented 
declSlonmakmg. The author concluded: 
Charactenzation of Ideas as 'abstract' or 'concrete' and reqwrements of 'novelty' 
and 'ongmality' are mearungless critena as prereqwsites for recovery. The courts' 
mdulgence In such amorphous and undefinable terms merely confuses the ISSUes 
before the court and the nghts and obligations of the party litigants. It IS apparent 
that deciSions cannot be based upon words wluch neither the courts nor the parties 
can adequately define. Nevertheless, the courts' use of such terms IS ultimately 
deternnnative. 
Id. at 322. Although the author's focus IS on state law protection of Ideas, Ius comments are 
equally relevant to the Idea-expresslon dichotomy In copynght law. \ 
Professor Samuels exammed the Idea-expresslon dichotomy and its flaws and concluded that 
otlier copynght doctnnes-pnnclpally, ongInaIity and substantial SImilarity-were far better 
approaches to deternnnmg copynght Infnngement than the Idea-expresslon dichotomy. Samuels, 
supra note 95, at 462. He considered the Idea-expresslOn dichotomy troublesome because it 
deternnned the lack of copynghtability of matenal m a work rather than SImply haVing courts 
conclude that work had not been mfnnged. Samuels, supra note 95, at 408-09. In thiS way, 
according to Samuels, the Idea-expresslon dichotomy was overly broad In its Impact on the 
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to fictIOnal literary works, that IS, books, plays and mOVIes, reveals the 
Impact that artIstIC evaluatIOn has had on these determmatIOns. 128 
B. The Idea-ExpreSSIOn Dichotomy Applied 
1. Works of the Visual Arts 
The Idea-expressIOn dichotomy has been applied both to two-dimensIOnal 
works of the VISUal arts, such as pIctures, photographs and fabnc deSIgns, 
and to three-dimensIOnal works, such as sculptures and stuffed toys. Al-
though Judge Hand concluded m a case mvolvmg the alleged mfnngement 
of a fabnc deSIgn that it was ObVIOUS that "no pnnclple can be stated as 
to when an Imitator has gone beyond the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 
scope of copynght protection provided to works of authorship. See Samuels. supra note 95, at 
462. 
See also Kaplan, Implied Contract and the Law oj Literary Property, 42 CALIF. L. REv 28, 
32-33 (1954) (idea-expresslOn distinction no longer clear now that cOPYright not limited to 
protection only agamst literal copymg, but also agamst transformation of a work mto a different 
medium); Meadow, TeleVISIOn Formats: The Search jor Protection, 20 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP 
(ASCAP) 73, 87-96 (1970) (as applied to teleVISion formats, Idea-expression dichotomy IS vague, 
arbitrary and leads to ad hoc deCISions by courts as to what should be protected; rather, courts 
should analyze formats, lookmg for theatrical value based on dramatic potential, speCial, umque 
elements or gimmicks, and completeness to determme line between protected and unprotected 
teleVISIon formats); Umbrelt, supra note 35, at 944-45, 952-53 (author concludes that there IS 
no objective way to determme mfrlngement); Note, Reading COPYright Cases: The Ad Hoc 
Approach, 2 COMMIENT 671 (1980) (metaphYSical nature of subject matter at Issue m copynght 
, necessitates an ad hoc approach where the attitudes and backgrounds of the judges affect their 
deCISions); Note, Derivative- Works and the Protection oj Ideas, 14 GA. L. REv 794, 800 (1980) 
(idea-expressIOn dichotomy should only be applied to works valued for conveymg practical 
mformation, not to artistic or literary works valued for creative effort where the application of 
that prinCiple "prOVides no gUidance for the Identification of the protectable as opposed to the 
non-protectable elements"); Note, CopYright Protection jor Mass-Produced Commercial Prod-
ucts: A ReView oj the Developments Followmg Mazer v. Stem, 38 U. Cm. L. REv 807 (1971) 
(author argues that as applied to mass-produced commerCial products, the Idea-expressIOn 
dichotomy has been mampulated by the parties and the courts to reach results based on external 
factors, such as the busmess morality of the defendant); Recent Developments, 67 MICH. L. 
REv 167, 170 (1968) (author prefers the mathematical finiteness approach used m MorrISSey to 
the subjective approach used by courts through the Idea-expressIOn dichotomy, which the author 
chums "is little more than a labeling techmque applied to the results of particular cases"); cj. 
Goldman, Observations on COPYright and Ideas, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv 574 (1969). 
128. ThiS Issue has become even more difficult as courts have attempted to apply It m the 
context of works such as computer programs. See generally Halvey, A Rose by Any Other 
Name: Computer Programs and the Idea-ExpresSion Distinction, 35 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP 
(ASCAP) 1 (1989); Note, Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/expressIOn Dichotomy m 
COPYright Protection oj Computer Sojtware, 35 UCLA L. REV 723 (1988). A diSCUSSIOn of 
thiS area IS beyond the scope of thiS Article. 
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'expressIon,"'129 most of the opImons reflect an attempt to find such a 
pnncIple. The most Important doctrmal pomt that has emerged from thIs 
attempt to find a pnncIpled way to draw the line between an Idea and its 
expressIon ,IS the notion that even where two works are nearly Identical m 
appearance, if those sImilarities m appearance are held to have necessarily 
resulted from the defendant's use of the same Idea as that used by the 
plamtiff, there will be no mfrmgement. Thus, the subject matter and those 
elements whIch are necessary or commonly used to depIct it are defined as 
the uncopyrightable "idea" m works of the visual artS. 130 
The court recogruzed, for example, that m Franklin Mint Corp. v. National 
Wildlife Art Exchange: J3J 
[I]n the world of fine art" the ease with whIch a copynght may be 
delineated may depend on the artist's style. A painter like Monet when 
dwelling upon ImpresSIOns created by light on the facade of the Rouen 
Cathedral IS apt to create a work whIch can make mfnngement attempts 
difficult. On the other hand, an artist who produces a rendition with 
photograph-like clarity and accuracy may be hard pressed to prove 
unlawful copYIng by another who uses the same subject matter and the 
same techruque. A copynght m that CIrcumstance may be tenned 'weak,' 
SInce the expresSIon and the subject matter converge. In contrast, m the 
ImpressIOrust's work the lay observer will be able to differentiate more 
readily between the reality of subject matter and subjective effect of the 
artist's work.132 
129. Peter Pan Fabncs, Inc. v. Martin Werner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960). In tryrng 
to detenmne if the copynght on the plarntiff's fabnc desIgn had been rnfnnged, Judge Hand 
concluded that "[t]he test for rnfnngement IS of necessity vague. ObVIOusly, no pnnclple 
can be stated as to when an Imitator has gone beyond cOPYing the 'idea,' and has borrowed 
its 'expressIOn.' DeCISIons must therefore rnevitably be ad hoc." [d. at 489 (emphasIS In onglnal). 
Judge Hand reasoned that In companng plaintiff's desIgn with the defendant's alleged copy, 
the court should consIder the ultimate function of the deSIgn when used on an article of clothing 
and "how far its overall appearance will detenmne its aesthetic appeal when the cloth IS made 
Into a garment." [d. Given that function, Judge Hand concluded that even though the patterns 
were not Identical, the Slntilarities In color and In the shapes and symbols used In the pattern 
were enough that the ordinary observer would "regard theIr aesthetic appeal as the same." [d. 
Thus, Judge Hand seemed willing to concede that these detenmnations cannot be pnnclpled, 
and In the end are based on how the works appeal to the tastes of the deCISIon maker. 
130. See mira notes 131-90 and accompanymg text. Tills pnnCIple IS often referred to as the 
"merger" doctnne-that IS, when the uncopynghtable Idea necessitates the fonn of expreSSIOn, 
that fonn of expressIOn must be treated as uncopynghtable as well because it merges with the 
unprotectable Idea. See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 95, at 382-95. Samuels critiCIZes tills theory 
as nusleading, srnce he finds that "true merger" rarely occurs, rd. at 386-91, and as unnecessarily 
broad In the way that it limits the scope of copynght protection. [d. at 391-95. In the latest 
edition of Nimmer's treatise on copynght, the authors also argue that it would be preferable 
not to treat the common elements that are conSIdered necessary to express a certain Idea as 
uncopynghtable; rather, the authors suggest that the courts should conSIder thIS "merger" 
factor SImply as part of the defense to Infnngement In a particular case. See 3 M. NIMMER & 
D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 13.03[B](3], at 13-58, 59. 
131. 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.), cert. demed, 439 U.S. 880 (1978). 
132. [d. at 65 (citations omitted). 
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In other words, to distmgUIsh the "expreSSIOn" from the "idea" m a work 
of VISUal art, the Judge has to determme if a gIven theme or subject matter 
by its very nature defines the way the artist has rendered it. An artist who 
depIcts somethmg as it IS actually perceIved will have little m the work that 
will be consIdered copynghtable expressIon. The artISt who uses a nontra-
ditional or nonrepresentational style of depIcting the basIC subject matter 
will have a stronger clrum to copynght because the Judge will not be forced 
to conclude that the basIC subject matter dictated that partlcular style of 
expreSSIon. 
What the courts have not generally been willing to recogmze, however, IS 
that these determmatIOns are based on the court's assessment of the artistic 
value of the works at lssue. First of all, the courts have consIderable flexibility 
m determmmg how narrowly to define the underlymg "idea" m a gIven 
work; thIS definition IS CritICal because it determmes how much of the work 
will be conSIdered protectable expresSIOn and how much will be unprotected 
by the copyrIght. As the cases discussed below mdicate, often a court's VIew 
of what constitutes the "idea" IS mfluenced by how novel or creative the 
court conSIders the works at Issue to be; courts also seem mfluenced by the 
relatIve commercIal success of the works, theIr market value and the repu-
tatIOns of thelr creators. Havmg defined the "idea," the court's second 
determmation, that IS, how much of the expreSSIOn used was dictated by 
that Idea, IS determmed also m part by the court's assessment of the artIStIC 
value of the work. The determmatIOn that a partIcular work IS life-like and, 
thus, less an ongmal work of the artist than one that has a distinctIve style, 
IS a value Judgment that reflects the Judge's VIew as to what IS "life-like" 
and as to what constitutes a distinctive, and therefore copynghtable, "style." 
In Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v Kalpaklan,133 for example, the 
plruntiff's copynght of a Jewel-encrusted bee pm was held not to be mfnnged 
by the defendants' nearly ldentlcal renditIon of the same subject because 
"[t]here IS no greater SImilarity between the pms of plruntiff and defendants 
than IS meVItable from the use of Jewel-encrusted bee forms m both. "134 The 
court observed that the pms "were life-like representations of a natural 
creature"13S and relied on the defendants' testimony that the arrangement of 
the Jewels on the pm "was SImply a functIOn of the SIZe and form of the 
bee pm and the SIZe of the Jewels used."136 The court's willingness to 
conclude that the arrangement of the Jewels was "SImply" a function of the 
SIze of the Jewels and the SIze and shape of the pm overlooks the fact that 
use of those partIcular elements themselves reflects some mdivldual chOIce. 
That IS, if the underlymg Idea had been defined as SImply a "bee," then 
133. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971). 
134. [d. at 742. 
135. [d. at 741. 
136. [d. at 740. 
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the chOIces of style, SIze, decoration and matenal could all have been 
consIdered protectable expressIon that had been copIed. The court's conclu-
SIon that only the uncopynghtable ideas and the elements necessary to express 
it were copIed may have had to do with the defendants' "standing as 
designers of fine Jewelry"137 and the court's Judgment that there was little 
creativity involved m the plaintiff's design smce it replicated the court's VIew 
of a real bee and thus had little distinctive style. 138 The court itself admitted 
that, "[a]t least m close cases, one may suspect, the classification [of Idea 
and expression] the court selects may SImply state the result reached rather 
than the reason for it." 139 
A companson of two cases mvolvmg toys representing human figures 
further reveals how evaluations of style and commercIal value and thus 
assessments of artistic value affect definitions of "idea" and "expressIon." 
In Mattei, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway International, Inc.,14O the court applied 
the Idea-expression dichotomy to two works, both expressmg the unprotected 
Idea of "a superhuman muscleman crouchmg m what smce Neanderthal 
times has been a traditional fighting pose." 141 The court reasoned that only 
those elements not necessarily dictated by that Idea could be protected, such 
as "the particular form created by the decIsIon to accentuate certain muscle 
groups."142 Since those elements, that IS, whIch muscle groups were accen-
tuated, were different m the two works, no copynght mfringement was 
found. 143 The court's conclUSIon that the "idea" here was a muscleman m 
a traditional pose was essential to thIs conclUSIon. If usmg that pose itself 
had been consIdered protected expreSSIon, the plaintiff mIght have been more 
successful. The court's willingness to see that pose as an "idea" reflected 
its View that the pose was recognized smce "Neanderthal times'" as "tradi-
tional," m other words, too common to receIve copynght protection. ThIs 
137. [d. at 741. 
138. [d., see also Reichman, supra note 91, at 1234 n.476. 
139. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp., 446 F.2d at 742. 
140. 724 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1983). 
141. [d. at 360. 
142. [d. 
143. [d. Similarly, m Aliottl v. R. DaIon & Co., 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987), the plamtiff's 
copynghted stuffed toy dinosaurs were held not to be mfnnged by defendant's toy dinosaurs. 
The plamtiff could have no copynght on the Idea of a stuffed dinosaur or on those "elements 
of expression that necessarily follow from the Idea," ld. at 901, mearung m tins case that 
plamtiff could not pomt to slmilanties that arose "from either the physIOgnomy of dinosaurs 
or from the nature of stuffed arumals." [d. Thus, the similarities m body shape and posture 
and the sunilarities m the nature of the soft matenals used were not sunilarities m protected 
expressIOn. Charactenstics such as the distinctive stitchmg and distinctive faCial features and 
body shapes could be protected, but defendant's works differed with respect to those elements. 
[d., see also Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1982) (toy differed 
III elements of expressIOn not dictated by Idea of snowman, for example, hats, feature Size, 
head shape and matenal). 
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concluslOn itself IS a reflectlOn of the court's VIew that the artIstic value of 
such toys IS based on theIr novelty.144 
On the other hand, In Quaker Oats Co. v Mel Appel Enterprzse,145 the 
court granted plaIntiff's motIon for a prelimInary InJunctlOn agaInst the 
defendant who was manufactunng dolls alleged to be Infnngements of 
plaIntiff's copynghted dolls. Both dolls were almost the same SIZe, about 
five Inches long, and made of matenal that enabled them to be squeezed 
and concealed InsIde an adult hand. Both were made of sImilar silky fabncs; 
both dolls had legs and arms that were outstretched and enlarged at the 
ends. The clothIng on both dolls was drawn on the bodies; the features of 
the faces on both dolls were sImply drawn, and both had half-moon smiles. 
Defendant's dolls sold, however, for half, or less than half, of the pnce at 
whIch plaIntiff's dolls were sold. Although the court Identified several 
differences between the dolls, for example, In haIr color, In haIr styling, and 
In detailing of facIal features, the court found substantIal sImilarity In 
protected expreSSlOn. 
The Quaker Oats court rejected defendant's claIm that only the Ideas and 
those features necessary to express those Ideas had been copIed. l46 The court 
also distIngUIshed Mattei by reasorung that unlike the basIc Idea of a life-
like human beIng In a fighting pose used In Mattei, In the case before it, 
"plaIntiff's work IS not a verSlOn of a standard human form or a standard 
doll form but an abstract work whIch IS entIrely ongInal."147 The court's 
determInation that the Quaker Oats dolls were "entIrely ongInal" and 
"abstract" works and not verSlOns of a "standard doll," as were at Issue 
In Mattei, reflected the court's assumptlOns about and expenences with dolls 
and its own assessment of the artistic value of such works, Including their 
"style" and commercIal value. If the court had defined the "idea" of 
plaIntiff's doll more specifically to be a five-Inch, squeezable doll with 
144. To some extent, there seems to be an overlap between conSiderations of ongmality and 
the Idea-expressIOn dichotomy m these deterrrunatIons. That IS, courts such as the MatteI court 
seem to define the "idea" based on whether the way the subject matter has been expressed IS 
"ongInal." If the mode of expression IS well-known, then the author's use of that mode of 
expressIOn may not be "ongmal," but makmg that determmatIon of ongInality would reqUire 
an exammation of the first author's creative process. As Judge Hand observed m Sheldon v. 
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert. demed, 298 U.S. 669 (1936), "if by 
some magic a man who had never known it were to compose a new Keats' Ode on a Grecian 
Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copynghted it, others might not copy that poem, 
though they might of course copy Keats' " [d. at 54. To disnuss a mode of expression as an 
uncopynghtable Idea because it IS conSidered common rather than haVing a specific, separate 
diSCUSSion of the question of ongInality IS clearly misleading. Simply because the court considers 
a mode of expression to be "traditional" does not necessarily mean that the mode was not 
ongInal to the author seekmg copynght protection. See also Samuels, supra note 95, at 426-'38 
(discussmg ongInality as a prereqUisite for copyright protection). 
145. 703 F Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
146. [d. at 1060. 
147. [d. 
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outstretched arms and half-moon smiles, defendant nught not have been 
held liable. 
The implication of artistic values that occurs when the judge defines what 
he or she considers to be that underlying "idea" and then makes some 
evaluation of the style of representation of the Idea m the work IS also 
illustrated by two cases mvolvmg three-dimensIonal representations of dogs. 
In both cases the court might have concluded that the underlymg Idea was 
sImply to depIct a dog, and that any specific chOIce made by the creator m 
depicting a dog was thus protectable expreSSIOn to the extent not dictated 
by the general Idea of a dog. In both cases, however, the courts defined the 
underlying idea more specifically. In Gund, Inc. v Smile International Inc., 148 
the court defined the underlymg Idea behmd plamtiff's stuffed toy dog as a 
"more or less realiStIc, non-ngId stuffed toy dog that 'flops' down on its 
stomach."149 Observing that it IS "a common SIght to see puppIes act thIs 
way" and that there are only "a limited number of ways"150 to express thIs 
idea, the court demed plamtiff's motion for a prelinunary mjunction because 
it found that the defendant had only copIed thIs Idea of a floppy dog and 
those elements essential to expressmg it. lSI The court observed that "SImilarity 
m expreSSIOn IS non-infnngmg to the extent the nature of the creation makes 
sImilarity necessary."152 Because the court refused to see the chOIce of pose 
m the plamtiff's work as "expressIOn," the plamtiff was demed relief. 
In contrast, the court m Kmckerbocker Toy Co. v. Geme Toys, Inc. IS3 
granted summary judgment for the plamtiff where the defendant had man-
ufactured a stuffed dog in a tram engineer's uniform that was nearly Identical 
to plamtiff's copynghted work with respect to SIZe, shape, color, eyes, nose, 
mouth, other facIal charactenstics and clothIng. ls4 The nunor difference m 
skin tone and the elinunation of a handkerchIef used on plamtiff's toy were 
not enough to overcome what the court found to be substantial SImilarities 
m expression. The court rejected defendant's suggestion. that the SImilarities 
were dictated by the common, unprotected Idea of a dog m an engineer's 
uniform, charactenzmg the argument as approachIng "new heIghts m ab-
surdity."lss The court reasoned that, "[w]hile such a phenomenon might 
eXist, it is hardly so common as to reqUIre the conclusIOn that thIs combI-
nation IS common or somehow m the public domam."ls6 The court's reactIon 
to the subject matter as novel thus affected its refusal to treat that subject 
148. 691 F Supp. 642 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aiI'd mem., 872 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1989). 
149. [d. at 645. 
150. [d. 
151. [d. 
152. [d. at 645. 
153. 491 F Supp. 526 (E.D. Mo. 1980). 
154. [d. 
155. Kmckerbocker Toy Co., 491 F Supp. at 529. 
156. [d. 
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matter as "idea." The court's attentlOn to the fact that plaIntiff's dog was 
a commercIal success and was "enjoyed by children and adults alike"157 and 
its observatIon that defendant's toy dog was "clearly a cheaper verSIon of 
that produced by plaIntiff,"158 may also mdicate why the court was so willing 
to treat defendant's argument that the sImilarities were based on the use of 
the same basIc Idea of a dog m an engmeer's costume as absurd. Thus, 
because the court m Kmckerbocker refused to define the unprotected "idea" 
as "a dog m an engineer's costume," the plaIntiff's toy dog m that case 
was granted protection, whereas the court's willingness to define the Idea 
behInd the plaIntiff's toy dog m Gund as "floppy dog" resulted m a demal 
of protection. The deterIDlnatlon that a "floppy dog" IS a common, unpro-
tected Idea, but that a "dog m an engmeer's costume" IS not, IS a value 
Judgment that reflects what that Judge knows and feels about dogs, toys 
and these stuffed toy dogs m particular .159 
Edwards v Rujjnerl60 also mdicates the way that personal expenence and 
values affect how restnctlvely courts define the "idea" and those elements 
necessary to express it m any given work. In Edwards, plaIntiff's copynght 
m a photograph of a ballet dancer's lower legs posed m ballet's fifth position 
was held not to be mfnnged by defendant's photograph of the same subJect.161 
The defendant's model wore different clothes on her legs, and the photograph 
had been taken from a different angle and with a different overall presen-
tatlOn and effect.162 Although the court here explicitly observed that thIs was 
not a case m WhICh it was difficult to separate the "idea" from its 
"expressIon," the court mIght have ruled that although the basIC Idea of 
photographmg a ballet dancer was not protectable, plaIntiff's declSlon to 
157. Id. at 527 
158. Id. at 528. 
159. In another case mvolvmg the artistic depiction of dogs, F W Woolworth Co. v. 
Contemporary Arts, 193 F.2d 162 (lst Cir. 1951), a/i'd, 344 U.S. 228 (1952), the First Circwt 
slUd that "a copyright on a work of art does not protect a subject, but only the treatment of 
a subJect." Id. at 164. In the case before it, mvolvmg models of cocker sparuel dogs posed m 
traditional show position, the court mterpreted thiS to mean that the copynght would not 
protect the subject of a cocker sparuel model or the Size, color or mafenals, or pose used 
because those were elements of "subject" or "idea," but the copynght would protect the 
proportIon, form, contour and configuration of the models because those were onglnal contn-
butlons of the artist. Id. Because the defendant's work was substantially sunilar m proportion 
and configuration, for example, m the configuration of the curls and folds of the fur on the 
dog models, the finding of mfnngement was upheld, even though one model showed the dog 
With long hlUr on ItS body and neck and the other showed it With short hlUr. Id. at 165. The 
court's deCISion to consider the pose of the dogs, that IS, the "traditional show posItion," as 
part of the unprotectable "idea" IS arguably a reflection of the court's Judgment that the 
traditional pose IS so common that it should be treated as unprotected by the court. The court 
may also have been mfluenced by the fact that plamtiff's dogs sold for pnces up to $15, 
whereas defendant's sold for $1.19. 
160. 623 F Supp. 511 (S.D.N.V 1985). 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
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photograph Just the legs from the knee down, placed In fifth positlOn, was 
itself a particulanzed way of expreSSIng an Idea that the defendant had 
substantially copIed. The court's assessment of the work's artistic value based 
on its feelings about and knowledge of ballet and photography, undoubtedly 
affected how broadly the court was willing to define the unprotected Idea 
In that case. 
Similar factors are reflected In Stemberg v Columbia Pictures Industnes,163 
where the court compared the plaIntiff's poster of a New Yorker's VIew of 
the world with the promotional poster defendant had used to advertIse its 
fIlm, Moscow on the Hudson. There was no dispute as to the defendant's 
access to plaIntiffs very popular poster. In grantIng plaIntiff's motion for 
summary Judgment, the court found that although defendant was free to 
use the Idea of "a map of the world from an egocentncally myopIC 
perspective,"I64 the defendant had gone beyond the Idea and copIed too 
much of the plaIntiff's particularIzed expressIon of that Idea.16S Both posters 
showed four city blocks In detail In the foreground; In both, those blocks 
were placed at the IntersectIon of a wide two-way cross street and two 
avenues. Such specific chOIces the court consIdered to be protected expreSSIOn 
as a reflection of the artist's ongInal work. The court reasoned that "one 
can hardly gaInsay the nght of an artISt to protect hIs chOIce of perspective 
and layout In a drawIng, especIally In conjunction with the overall and 
IndiVIdual details."I66 Although the defendant had argued that such chOIces, 
that IS, of the perspective and the use of elements found In a tYPICal city 
Intersection, were dictated by the use of the same Idea, the court rejected 
that argument. 167 In concluding that the chOIce of thIS partIcular perspectIve 
was an element of expreSSlOn, the court observed that "thIs IS not an 
Inevitable way of depIcting blocks In a CIty with a gnd-like street system, 
particularly SInce most J:iew York City cross streets are one-way "168 Thus, 
the use of two-way streets as cross streets was conSIdered protectable ex-
preSSIOn because it was not dictated by the reality of New York City's one-
way cross streets. Given the limited chOIces of USIng either two-way or one-
way streets, the court could as easily have concluded that thIS chOIce was 
not protectable expressIOn. 
The court also found that the posters were SImilar In the use of a sketchy, 
whImSIcal style. The court observed, "[e]ven at first glance, one can see the 
163. 663 F Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
164. [d. at 712. 
165. [d. 
166. [d. 
167. [d. at 713. The court also conSidered the many differences between the posters, for 
example, the depiction of Moscow m detail m the background and the realistic likenesses of 
the movie's stars m the foreground of defendant's poster, as not suffiCient to elimmate the 
substantial Similarities m expressIOn between the two posters. [d. 
168. [d. at 712. 
218 INDIANA LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 66:175 
strikmg stylistIc relationshIp between the posters, and smce style IS one 
mgredient of 'expressIOn,' thIS relatIOnshIp IS significant."169 The court's 
willingness to assume that it could distmgUlsh and Identify the "style" used 
m the poster and the court's comments on the plamtiff's fame and the 
popularIty of the posterl7O reveal how Its assessment of the work's artIstIC 
value affected Its declSlon. The court itself recogruzed the ad hoc nature of 
its deCISIon; the court observed that "[n]o ngid pnnciple has been developed 
to ascertam when one has gone beyond the Idea to the expresslOn,''!7. 
and quoting Judge Frankel, noted that "'[g]ood eyes and common sense 
may be as useful as deep study of reported and unreported cases, whIch 
themselves are tIed to hIghly particulanzed facts."'I72 
The applicatIOn of the Idea-expressIOn dichotomy to fabnc deSIgns also 
reveals that assessments of artIstic value may mfluence how broadly courts 
will define the baSIC Idea m a gIven work and the elements necessary to 
express them. Thus, m Kenbrooke Fabrzcs, Inc. v Holland Fabrzcs, Inc., 173 
the court found substantIal SImilarity between the plamtiff's and defendant's 
fabnc deSIgn of a double floral border with a field of flowers m the center, 
even though there were differences m details and style, because the court 
concluded that the ordinary observer would conSIder the two fabncs to have 
the same aesthetIC appeal. 174 The court did not addrells the possibility that 
these SImilaritIes resulted from the use of the same Idea. Yet, m Hedaya 
Brothers, Inc. v Capital Plastics, Inc.,175 the court found no mfrmgement 
of plamtiff's fabnc deSIgn depIctmg vanous types of frUlt m mason Jars 
with a gmgham check background by defendant's fabnc deSIgn depIctmg the 
same kmds of fruit m mason Jars on a gmgham check background. 176 Notmg 
the differences m the shapes of the Jars and m some mmor details m how 
the fruit was arranged m those Jars, as well as some differences m color 
and style, the court concluded that there was no mfrmgement because the 
copynght did not protect the Idea· of frUlt m Jars on a gmgham background, 
an Idea the court conSIdered "old hat."177 Rather, plamtiff's expreSSIOn of 
that Idea, whIch the court conSIdered to be of mirumal ongmality, was not 
substantially SImilar to defendant's expreSSIOn of that Idea.ns The court's 
169. [d. 
170. [d. at 708-09. 
171. [d. at 712. 
172. [d. (quoting Couleur Int'l Ltd. v. Opulent FabriCS, Inc., 330 F Supp. 152, 153 
(S.D.N.Y 1971». 
173. 602 F Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y 1984). 
174. [d. at 154; see also Imperial Textile Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Ametex FabriCS, Inc., 682 
F Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y 1987) (plamtiff's fabriC deSign of large petaled flowers and stems on 
a solid background mfrlnged by defendant'S Similar pattern even when different colors used). 
175. 493 F Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y 1980). 
176. [d. at 1023. 
177 [d. at 1024. 
178. [d. 
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decisIOn that the design of fruit m Jars on a gmgham background was only 
"old hat" and thus an unprotectable Idea IS a reflection of the court's 
assessment of the artistic value of the work at Issue. 
In E. Mishan & Sons, Inc. v. Marycana, Inc., 179 E. Mishan & Sons brought 
an action for declaratory Judgment agamst Marycana, the owner of the 
copynght m refngerator magnets made to look like traditional Amencana 
samplers. ISO Marycana argued that the copynght had been mfnnged by 
magnets made by the plamtiff. Both the copyrighted magnets and the alleged 
infnngmg copies consisted of a square white card pasted onto a cardboard 
square that was covered with a calico or gingham fabric with a fnnge of 
eyelet lace. On the white card a "homey" message was written In calligraphy 
and an lIDitation flower was glued. The copies differed from the copynghted 
magnets, however, with respect to the specific saymgs, the flat rather than 
gathered appearance of the lace, and the type of Imitation flowers used. In 
spite of these differences, the court found that Mishan had taken more than 
the Idea of a kitchen magnet made to look like an Amencana sampler, but 
had also "explicitly copied those aspects of [the copyrighted] work that were 
the product of its mdependent authorship, mcluding what IDlght be called 
the artistic details of [the copynghted] work."lsl The court noted that the 
mfnngIng magnet "looks like a cheap copy of [the protected work] with a 
few changes made and a different saYing, which IS exactly what it IS."IS2 
The court concluded that there had been mfnngement of Marycana's cop-
ynght m the kitchen magnets. IS3 Thus, although one could argue that only 
the Idea of a magnet lookmg like an Amencana sampler and those elements 
commonly used to depict it had been taken here, as was found m Hedaya, 
this court defined Marycana's idea more narrowly, leavmg more of the work 
to be considered protectable expression that had been copied by Mishan. l84 
Thus, the application of the Idea-expressIOn dichotomy to works of the 
ViSUal arts has reqUIred the court to Identify the basiC unprotected Idea and 
those details that are necessary or commonly used to depIct that Idea. Those 
aspects of the work, that IS, the idea and those elements that are necessary 
or commonly used to depIct that Idea, are then consIdered non-copynghtable. 
Only those details that reflect a personal chOIce of the artist, not dictated 
by the choice of the basiC Idea, are consIdered to be protected by the 
copynght. Each of these detefIDlnations, that IS, the definition of the basIC 
Idea and of those elements necessary to depIct it, however, IS a reflection of 
the personal reaction of the judge to the style and novelty of the plamtiff's 
179. 662 F Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
180. [d. at 1340. 
181. [d. at 1345-46. 
182. [d. at 1345. 
183. [d. 
184. [d. at 1346. 
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and defendant's works, the relatlve commerclal value and success of the 
works and the reputation of the creators of those works, reactions that 
lmplicate the Judge's subjective Vlew of the artistic value of the works at 
Issue. 
2. LIterary Works 
Judge Learned Hand's analysls of the ldea-expresslon lssue m Nichols v. 
Umversal Pictures Corp.185 lS probably the best place to begm a reVlew of 
the applicatlon of the ldea-expressIOn dichotomy to literary works. Conslstent 
with hIs later Vlew expressed m Peter Pan Fabrzcs,186 Judge Hand observed 
m Nichols that there lS no preClse, predictable pomt where ldeas end and 
expreSSlon begms. In discussmg whether the defendant's mOVIe about lovers 
from different religiOUS backgrounds mfnnged the copynght m plamtiff's 
play whlch mvolved a slmilar plot, Judge Hand reasoned: 
Upon any work, and especIally upon a play, a great number of patterns 
of mcreasmg generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the 
mCIdent IS left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most 
general statement of what the play IS about, and at times nught consIst 
only of its title; but there IS a pomt m this senes of abstractions where 
they are no longer protected, smce otherWIse the playwnght could prevent 
the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from theIr expresSIon, his property 
IS never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and 
nobody ever can. l87 
In other words, m a literary work, the copynght protection clearly extends 
beyond literal repetition of the words used by the author, but Judge Hand 
claImed that there lS no preclse way of defimng how far that protection will 
gO.188 As applied to the case before hIm, Judge Hand found that the 
185. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. demed, 282 u.s. 902 (1931). 
186. 274 F.2d at 489. 
187. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 (citations omitted). 
188. Professor Chafee, uSlllg Nichols as an example, attempted to find a rational method 
for separatlng an Idea from Its expression III the context of literary works. Chafee, Reflections 
on the Law of COPYright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REv 503, 513 n.24 (1945). Professor Chafee 
proposed a "pattern" test III whIch the line between an Idea and its expreSSIOn, and thus 
between non-liability and liability, would be crossed when the "pattern of a play-the sequence 
of events and the development of the Illterplay of the characters"-was copied. Id. at 514. 
COPYIng the basiC Idea was permIssible, and smce "some resemblance m characters and 
situation IS mevitable," ld. at 513-14, that would be permitted as well. Professor Chafee did 
not, however, prOVide any gUIdelines for finding thIs "pattern" or how detailed it needed to 
be m order for it to no longer be conSidered an mevitable way of expressmg the basiC Idea. 
Nimmer and Nimmer, although recogruzmg that the problem of separating the Idea from 
its expressIOn "is probably susceptible of no more precise pnnclple than that of the Chafee 
'pattern' test," 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 13.03[A][I], at 13-27, attempted 
to refine that test, commenting that "[t]he pattern test, if correctly applied, offers a gUIde to 
deCISion whIch aVOids the abandonment of reasoned analysIs Implicit m the conclUSion that 
nothmg more can be srud than that each case turns on its own facts." Id. at 13-28. Nimmer 
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similarities In plot between the two works were not enough to find that 
protected expreSSIOn had been taken. Even though both works Involved a 
relationship between a JeWIsh family and an Irish family, a secret marriage 
between the son and daughter of these two families, a conflict between the 
two fathers and an ultimate reconciliation, the plaIntiff was not allowed to 
prevail against the defendant for cOPYIng these elements because In the 
court's VIew these sImilarities were "too generalized an abstraction from 
what she wrote. It was only a part of her 'ideas."'ls9 The elaboration of 
this general theme In defendant's work was found to be sufficIently different 
from the elaborations In plamtiff's work to avoId copyright Infnngement. 
As Judge Hand reasoned: 
[H]er copynght did not cover everythIng that IDIght be drawn from her 
play; its content went to some extent Into the public domaIn. We have 
to decide how much, and while we are aware as anyone that the line, 
wherever it IS drawn, will seem arbitrary, that IS no excuse for not 
draWing it; it IS a question such as courts must answer In nearly all 
cases. '90 
In thIs case, the court found that the defendant had not crossed the line 
between Idea and expreSSIon In creating a work with a SImilar plot structure 
and Nimmer illustrated tlus "reasoned analysIs" by applYIng the pattern test to compare 
Romeo and Juliet and West Side Story. ConsIdenng it "clear that anyone could borrow the 
'idea' of a romance between members of two hostile families." rd., Nimmer and Nimmer then 
Identified tlurteen SImilarities In the sequence of events that occur In each work and concluded 
that "[t]hese tlurteen POInts are suffiCIently concrete to state the essential sequence of events 
and character Interplay In each of the two works." [d. at 13-29 to 13-30. Thus. Infnngement 
should be found, even though there were other details and Important story POInts that differed. 
as well as differences In dialogue. setting and charactenzation. Nimmer and Nimmer recognIzed 
that not all courts would agree that these slmiianties constituted a "suffiCIently concrete 
expressIon of an Idea" to result In a finding of Infnngement. but Nimmer and Nimmer critiCIZe 
those courts that conSIder "plot" as eqUIvalent to "idea" Instead of applYIng the "pattern" 
definition of a plot, that IS. "the sequence of events by wluch the author expresses Ius 'theme' 
or ·idea .... rd. at 13-31 (quoting Slupman v. RKO. 100 F.2d 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1938». and 
treating it as expresSIon. Nimmer and Nimmer do not discuss how a court IS to deCIde whether 
particular plot InCIdents are Included as essential to the structure of the plot and thus how 
much of that plot must be copIed before the copIer will cross the line between an Idea and 
its expressIOn. Nimmer and Nimmer seem to agree with the outcome In Nichols, even though 
one could find some basIC SImilarities In the sequence of events used to express the Idea. 3 
M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER. supra note 18. at 13-28 n.26. See generally Libott, supra note 118. 
at 751-52. Thus. even those who have attempted to find a rational method for distinguIslung 
an Idea from its expressIon In the context of literary works have not aVOIded the fundamental 
problem that every such detenmnation IS ultimately grounded In some subjective reaction to 
the merits of the work. 
189. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122; see also Dymow v. Bolton. 11 F.2d 690. 692 (2d Cir. 1926) 
(plot as "the mere concept of a situation around wluch to build and develop literary adornment 
IS not copynghtable"); Giangrasso v. CBS. Inc., 534 F Supp. 472 (B.D.N.Y. 1982) (radio 
scnpt not Infnnged by teleVISIon show where both used Idea of a radio show beIng broadcast 
from a remote location that IS Interrupted by a hold-up, but where the emphasIS, story line 
and charactenzation were very different). 
190. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122. 
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and smrilar characters. Thus, the "idea" m a literary work IS not limited to 
the basIC subject matter, but mcludes some of the details used to develop 
and convey that subject matter. On the other hand, at some pomt certam 
details are consIdered "expressIOn" and are protected from copymg. 
The difficulties that Judge Hand recogmzed m drawmg the line between 
those details that are unprotected as part of the Idea and those details that 
are protected as part of the expreSSIOn m literary works are eVIdent mother 
cases. 191 For example, m Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v Stonesifer, 192 
the court found substantIal sImilarity between plamtiff's play and defendant's 
mOVIe where both told the story of a young woman.movmg mto a resIdentIal 
hotel for women m New York City In both works, the woman IS almost 
seduced by an older man and IS shot at by the man's Jealous lover.193 In 
spite of the fact that there were several plot differences between the two 
worksl94 and the fact that many of the sImilarities m character and plot 
could have been conSIdered to have evolved necessarily from the basIC plot 
Idea and locale,195 the court, citmg Nichols, concluded that the movie 
mfnnged the play.l96 
191. The easiest cases are those like Becker v. Loews, 133 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.), cert. demed, 
319 U.S. 772 (1943), where the plaIntiff's work was an essay on the economic and political 
problems of the 1930s, with a special emphaSIS on the Impact of such problems on young 
people. PlaIntiff claImed that defendant's movie about the economic struggles of a young 
couple dunng the 1930s Infmrged hiS copynght. The court held that there was no liability 
because the Similarity between the two works was limited to the baSIC Idea of the problems 
faced by youth dunng the Great DepreSSIOn. Id. at 892-94. Plaintiff's book was an essay with 
no characters, story line or dialogue, whereas defendant's work was a traditional movie With 
characters, plot, romance and dialogue. In this case there was Similarity only In Idea, not 
expreSSIOn, because there was no Similarity In the way the baSIC theme or Idea was presented. 
Id. 
A less clear case IS presented In Musto v. Meyer, 434 F SUpp. 32 (S.D.N.Y 1977), a/I'd 
mem., 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979), where plaintiff was the author of an article which appeared 
In a psychology Journal. The author Included In hiS generally SCientific discussIOn of COCaIne 
use a fictional sketch about Sherlock Holmes' use of cocaine and hiS cure of tlus addiction 
through Freudian methods. Even though the baSIC Idea of this sketch and all the key inCidents 
of the plot were used In defendant's book, the court found no Infnngement, reasorung that 
these were Similarities of Idea only and that the differences In audience appeal, plot delineation 
and literary skill were suffiCient to deny a findillg of Infnngement. Id. 
192. 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944). 
193. Id. at 581. 
194. Id. For example, In plaIntiff's play, the young woman IS brought to the city by her 
father and returns home to her family. In defendant's mOVie, the young woman comes to the 
city alone to be near her boyfnend. The boyfnend at first rejects her, but ultimately realizes 
Ius love for her after she IS endangered. In the end, she stays with the boyfnend. The court 
did not address these thematic differences or how they should be treated, but did comment 
that many of the other differences between the works could be attributed to the differences 
between live theater and film. Id. at 583. 
195. One could claIm that the Similarities In character-a worldly actress, an unemployed 
actress, a model, an Innocent young woman from a small town, an evil man Interested In 
sedUCing the young woman, and hotel employees-are either obVIOUS characters one would 
find In a New York reSidential hotel or characters essential to the unprotected baSIC plot Idea 
of the dangers faCIng an Innocent young woman moving to New York City. 
196. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d at 584. 
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It seems difficult to reconcile these two cases on any basis that relies 
entirely on some abstract line between an ldea and its expresslon. In Nichols, 
both works were based on the idea of star-crossed lovers from families of 
different religious backgrounds; in Stonesifer, both works were based- on the 
ldea of a young woman living In a New York City resldential hotel. In both 
cases, the essential. structures of the stones told in the two works were 
similar: In Nichols, both works told the story of a secret marriage between 
the lovers, a conflict between the fathers, the blrth of grandchildren and a 
family reconciliation; In Stonesifer, both works told the story of the young 
woman's arnval in New York, her relationsrups with resldents of the hotel, 
an evil man's attempt to seduce her, a threat by the man's jealous lover 
and her ultimate recognition of the dangers of the city. In both works there 
were also many thematic, plot and character differences. Despite the fact 
that In both cases the two works at lssue arguably had very comparable 
degrees of Slmilarity and of difference, In Nichols no Infnngement was found 
because the court concluded that only unprotected matenal had been taken. 
To the contrary, In Stonesifer, the court concluded that there were sufficient 
slmilarities In some of the details used In the works to find Infnngement; 
and although it cited Nichols In support of its conclusion, the Stonesifer 
court never considered whether those similarities derived from the use of the 
same baslc idea. 
Although it lS possible to dismiss the differences in outcome as a reflection 
of the Stonesifer court's careless reading of Nichols, it lS also possible that 
the court's determInation In Nichols that the similarities were unprotected 
reflected the court's Vlew that stones of star-crossed lovers are too common 
to be protectable, whereas perhaps the court In Stonesifer found the story 
of a young woman liVIng In a New York City resldential hotel to be novel 
and creative enough to merit broader protection. The more established and 
"old hat" the baslc ldea seems to the declSlon maker, the more likely the 
details that express that ldea will also be considered too established and "old 
hat" and thus unprotectable. This declSlon, that some plots are so common 
as to be unprotectable ldeas, whereas others are still novel enough to be 
protectable expresslon, may be rooted in what the judge knows about and 
values in literary works. 
Similar questions are raised when we compare Stonesifer with Reyher v. 
Children's TeleVISIOn Workshop.l97 In that case, the Second Circuit upheld 
a disIDlssal of the plaIntiff's claim where defendant's magaZIne story told 
the same baslc story as the plaIntiff's copynghted book: a child who is 
separated from rus or her mother describes the mother as "the most beautiful 
person In the world"198 to someone who offers to help find her. Many 
197. 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. demed, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). 
198. Id. at 92. 
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beautiful women are brought to the child, but none IS the mother; finally, 
a plam woman appears, and she IS the child's mother. Recogruzmg that 
"[t]he difficult task m an mfrmgement action IS to distill the non-protected 
Idea from protected expressIOn,"I99 the court focused on the different settings, 
the different moral emphasIs of each story and the fact that plamtiff's work 
had far more textual detail m finding no basIS for mfnngement. 200 The court 
also concluded that the sImilarities between the plot mCldents could be 
explamed as those that "necessarily result from Identical situations."201 Thus, 
the court concluded that "[s]ince both present only the same Idea, no 
mfnngement as to protected expreSSIOn occurred. "202 
Both Stonesifer and Reyher mvolved relatively sImple stones that are very 
sImilar m basIC structure, but different m details, thematic emphasIs and 
language. In fact, m terms of overall plot and character, there are more 
vanations between the two works m Stonesifer than there are between the 
two works m Reyher, yet there was mfnngement of protected expressIon 
found m Stonesifer and not m Reyher If the characters and plot details m 
Reyher were a necessary consequence of the basIC Idea, it IS not clear why 
the same cannot be saId of Stoneszfer 
A companson of other cases leads to further muddymg of any clear line 
between an Idea and its expreSSIOn. In Litchfield v Spzelberg,203 the lower 
court had granted summary Judgment m favor of the defendant, whose 
mOVIe, E. T., was alleged to be an mfnngement of plaIntiff's play, Lokey 
from .Maldemar Both works concerned fnendly aliens who were stranded 
on earth and who befnended a young child. In both stones, the alien had 
telekmetic po~ers and supernatural healing powers. In both plots, the child 
199. Id. at 91. 
2oo.Id. 
201. Id. at 92. ThiS pnnclple IS often referred to as the scenes a falre doctnne, that IS, the 
notion that certam similarities m baSIC plot will require slInilarities m the scenes and mCidents 
used to develop that plot. E.g., See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983); A.A. 
Hoehling v. Uruversal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. demed, 449 U.S. 
841 (1980); Reyher, 533 F.2d 87; see also Schwartz v. Uruversal Pictures Co., 85 F Supp. 
270, 275-76 (S.D. Cal. 1945) (application of scenes a falre doctnne to work not protected by 
federal copynght but by common law). The doctrine has been critiCized by one author as 
lackmg uniformity and continuity and as overused by defendants; that author concludes that 
some of these mconslstencles are due to the fact that Judges may not have the same 
understanding as to what IS common to a certam genre or motif. Note, COPYright Infrmgement: 
An Argument for the Elimmation of the Scenes a Falre Doctrme, 5 COMMIENT 147 (1982); 
see also Kurtz, COPYright: The Scenes a Falre Doctrme, 41 U. FLA. L. REv. 79 (1989) (scenes 
a falre doctrme IS conSidered by author as a useful tool to determme substantial sunilarity, 
but author concludes that treating scenes a falre as uncopynghtable may be unnecessary); 3 
M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 18, § 13.03[B][4), at 13-61 (footnotes omitted) ("Labeling 
certam stock elements as 'scenes a faIre' does not Imply that they are uncopynghtable; it 
merely states that similarity between plaIntiff's and defendant's works that are limited to 
hackneyed elements cannot furrush the baSIS for finding substantial similarity."). 
202. Reyher, 533 F.2d at 92-93. 
203. 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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taught the alien a little about human culture and about love. Both stones 
ended with the aliens going home. In spite of these sunilarities, the plaIntiff 
was demed a tnal, and summary Judgment for the defendant was affIrmed.204 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that there was no substantial sunilarity In mood, 
dialogue, characters or sequence, and that those sImilarities that did eXIst 
were "only at the general level for whIch plaIntiff cannot clrum copyrIght 
protection."20S It IS arguable, however, that plaIntiff's unprotected Idea was 
the basIC subject of an alien stranded on earth, and that the plaIntiff's 
particular story of what happened to the alien stranded on earth was all 
protected expression and that the vanous similarities In detail between 
plaIntiffs story and defendant's-for example, the alien's telekinetic and 
specIal healing powers, the befriending of a SIngle parent and children, the 
exposure to human emotions and human culture-are details not necessarily 
predictable from that subject matter and thus protectable. 
Although there were also SIgnifIcant differences In the details of the two 
alien stones,206 such differences have not always been enough to defeat a 
clrum of Infnngement In literary works. There were many differences, for 
example, between the works at Issue In Stonesifer, where Infnngement was 
found, and also in MacDonald v. DuMauner,2I11 where the Second Circuit 
found suffIcIent allegations of sunilarities to Justify reverSIng the grant of 
the defendant's motion for Judgment on the pleadings.208 In that case, the 
plaintiff clrumed that her novel about a young woman who became the 
second wife of an older, wealthy man, had been Infnnged by defendant's 
novel, Rebecca.209 In both works, the new wife was bothered by the seemIng 
continmn'g Influence of the rrrst wife over the husband, the servants, the 
house itself, and the husband's fnends.210 In both works the -second wife 
conSIdered leaVIng the husband, but ultimately learned that the husband truly 
loved her and had not loved the rrrst wife.211 Some of the more particular 
details of the story also appeared In both works, for example, gifts of harr 
brushes, a book with the rrrst wife's handwriting, an inCIdent with a mIrror, 
and the rrrst wife's use of a pet name for the husband.212 For purposes of 
the motion for Judgment on the pleadings, the court conSIdered these 
204.ld. 
205. ld. at 1357. 
206. Plruntiffs play was a mUSIcal; there were two aliens, not one; the child they befnend 
was a gIrl liVIng with her brother and father at a research center on the North Pole, not a 
boy liVIng with hIS brother, SIster and mother In suburban Amenca; the aliens cure the father, 
not a flower or a cut finger, as In E.T., the aliens go to Japan and elsewhere and meet a 
witch before leaVIng earth. They do not almost die, nor does the child, as occurred In E. T. 
207. 144 F:2d 696 (2d Cir. 1944). 
208. ld. at 701. 
209. ld. at 697. 
210. ld. at 698-99. 
211. ld. at 697-98. 
212. ld. at 699. 
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sufficient snnilaritles m protected elements of the plruntiff's work to withstand 
the defendant's motion, even though there were several, very significant 
differences m plot, charactenzatlOn, theme, and endings of the two works.213 
Although the court seemed pnmarily concerned with the premature nature 
of the proceeding, the court, aSSUmIng the truth of the allegations of access 
and copYIng for purposes of the motion, reasoned: 
In the case at bar the suppositious borrowmgs are not m the general 
outline of plot and character: m "ideas" as opposed to "expreSSIon." 
On the contrary they conSIst m a senes of concrete mCIdents and details, 
and if m fact these were all borrowed from the plamtiff, we cannot 
properly hold that the common matter was outSIde the protection of the 
copynght law 21' 
It IS not easy to understand why these sunilarities were enough to defeat 
defendant's motIon for judgment on the pleadings m MacDonald, but the 
Similarities between the works at Issue m Litchfield (for example, levitation 
of objects and special healing powers) were not enough to defeat that 
defendant's summary judgment motion. In both cases, it was assumed, for 
purposes of the prelimInary motions, that the defendants had access to the 
plruntiffs' work,2ls and both cases appear to mvolve works that are essentlally 
quite different m plot, character and theme, yet the outcomes of the 
prelimInary motions m the two cases were different. 
At the other end of the spectrum are cases m which it seems clear that 
the line between an Idea and its expression has been crossed because so 
much of the plot, character and theme (or feel) of a work have been taken. 
For example, m Unzversal City Studios v Film Ventures International, Inc., 216 
the owner of the copynght m the hit movie Jaws was granted a prelimInary 
mjunction agrunst the defendant who had produced the movie Great White. 217 
The court found that there was a Significant likelihood that the plamtiff 
would prevail on the ments given the substantial similarity not only m the 
general Idea of each movie-an AtlantiC Coast town terrOrIzed by a great 
white shark-but m the basiC story line, the sequence of events and the 
development and mterplay of the major characters.218 The court Identified a 
213. For example, m plamtiff's novel, the second wife never loved the husband, but mamed 
!urn to wm a bet; she was, m fact, m love With another man. The husband was a Violent, 
bad-tempered man who threatened her. After he died, she was reunited With her first love. In 
Rebecca, the second wife IS truly m love with the husband, who IS a gentle, patient man who 
never threatens her. She learns that the husband had murdered hiS first wife because she had 
been unfaithful and cruel; the husband IS arrested, but eventually exonerated, and the two go 
on to live their lives together. [d. at 697-99. 
214. MacDonald, 144 F.2d at 701. After a trial on the merits, the district court had ruled 
that plamtiff had not proven that defendant had access to the copynghted work and thus 
could not prove mfrlngement. MacDonald v. DuMaurler, 75 F SUpp. 655 (S.D.N.Y 1948). 
215. See MacDonald, 144 F.2d at 700; Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1355. 
216. 543 F Supp. 1134 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
217 [d. 
218. [d. at 1139, 1142. 
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long senes of plot and character snnilarities. These Included conflicts between 
surpnsIngly smlilar maIn characters Including a local politicIan more con-
cerned with tounsm than safety and a salty skIpper with an English accent 
out to capture the shark. The court also noted a number of smlilar scenes 
whIch Included nearly Identical opemng scenes In whIch a shark attacks while 
teenagers play on the beach as well as scenes in whIch sharks knock VIctimS 
off boats, fishermen are found dead In boats, children are Injured, politicIans 
apologIZe, and sImilar final scenes In whIch the sharks swallow fatal explosIve 
devices after eating the skIppers.219 The court rejected the defendant's ar-
gument that these scenes necessarily grew from the unprotected basIC Idea 
and found that these were snnilarities In expreSSIOn that would be conSIdered 
substantial by the ordinary observer.220 
Although thIs conclusion seems correct, the defendant's argument IS not 
entirely fnvolous. The court mIght have concluded that the smlilarities In 
the basIC plot structure grew naturally and necessarily out of the basIC Idea 
of a shark terrOrIZIng an Atlantic coast town. Even at the next level of 
detail, it can be argued that a conflict between a hero out to capture the 
shark and a villaIn who IS Indifferent IS also a common way of developIng 
that basIC Idea. If all those smlilarities-that IS, in basIc Idea, In the core 
structure of the plot and In the conflict between a hero and a villaIn-could 
be conSIdered unprotectable, then many of the other SImilarities could be 
considered Just common or necessary ways to develop those unprotected 
elements. For example, that the hero would be a skIpper of a boat and that 
the skIpper would have an English accent and be "salty" hardly seem like 
ongInal details.221 
219. [d. at 1137-39. 
220. Similarly, m Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327 (9th 
Cir. 1983), the tlurteen plot details Identified by the court as common to both the pl!llntiff's 
film, Star Wars, and defendant's Battlestar Galaetiea, were conSidered suffiCient eVidence of 
similarities m expression at least to provide pJ!Ilntiff with an opportunity for a tnal and thus 
to deny defendant's motion for summary Judgment. The similarities mcluded the followmg: 
both works were about a war between a galaxy's democratic and totalitanan forces; the hero 
m both was the son of a leader of the democratic forces; the leader was a wise and mystical 
man; their herome IS Impnsoned; a planet IS destroyed; a fnendly robot IS mJured; there IS a 
romance between the herome and the hero's fnend; there IS a scene with weird creatures m a 
bar; the totalitanan headquarters are attacked and the movies both end with an awards 
ceremony. See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Co-op Prods., Inc., 479 
F Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (muslcal-comedy condensed versIOn of Gone With the Wind 
usmg different names and different dialogue held to be an mfnngement by use of same 
settings, characters, situations and story line); ej. Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 
683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982) (where defendant had nght to use Tarzan character but not story 
m pl!llntiff's book, no mfrmgement found where, though baSIC outline of story was very 
similar, court conSidered differences m perspective, emphasis and mCldents suffiCient to find 
no substantial slmilanty m expression). 
221. With respect to fictional characters, it has been recogruzed that there IS a conflict 
between an author's nght to control the use of the· characters they create and other authors' 
needs for access to characters that are part of our culture. "Every artist builds upon the 
228 INDIANA LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 66:175 
Thus, as with the application of the Idea-expressIOn dichotomy to works 
of the vIsual arts, the application of that rule to fictIonal literary works 
often reqUIres courts to determIne what aspects of a gIven work are natural 
or necessary outgrowths of the use of the same basIC Idea. The plot details 
or charactenzations that seem to be common or essential ways of expreSSIng 
that basIC Idea are not consIdered copynghtable and can be freely used by 
others. On the other hand, those details such as specific chOIce of words or 
plot InCIdents and charactenzations not dictated by the basIC Idea are 
consIdered protected expreSSIon and, if substantially copIed, will result In 
liability for copynght Infnngement. 
Each of these deCISIons, however, reflects the Judge's VIew of the artIStIC 
value of the works at Issue based on what the judge knows about and values 
In literary works on that subject. E.D Hirsch, Jr. described how people use 
theIr past knowledge and expenences to Interpret what they are reading. = 
He described the way people learn to classify and asSOCIate certam facts 
through theIr expenence and education so that they create vanous schema 
or prototypes that they use to Interpret language. Hirsch Indicated that the 
substance of these schema varIes, depending on the particular background 
and expenence of the IndivIdual; he described as an example a study that 
showed how the word "bIrd" had different assocIations for Australians than 
it did for Amencans.223 By extenSIon, one could argue that when a judge 
tnes to extrapolate the "idea" from the "expressIOn" In a literary work, hIs 
or her judgments as to what IS necessary to express a gIven Idea will reflect 
the partIcular background knowledge and assocIations of that judge, as a 
reader of language and works of hIs or her literary culture. That IS, any 
determInatIOn that a specific detail In plot or character IS itself an Idea or 
the necessary outgrowth of an Idea IS a determInatIOn based on the declSlon 
maker's Judgment as to the ongInality of that detail: IS it so common and 
predictable that it does not merit protection, or IS It new enough or personal 
enough that the author deserves copyrIght protectIOn? 
creativity of the past, and the creations of others are among the raw materIals used to create 
new works of art." Kurtz, The Independent Legal L,ves oj Fictional Characters, 1986 WIS. 
L. REv 429, 438. Kurtz argues that "[o]nly the COPYIng of distinctive and well-developed 
qualities constitutes cOPYIng of expression rather than Ideas. If the use of broad or 
stereotYPical qualities were conSidered infringement, lists of human charactenstics would be 
Withdrawn from the pool of what authors need to create fiction." Id. at 463. Kurtz proposes 
a two-part determination, first separating the Ideas from expressIOn and second, determlmng 
if the defendant has taken so many of the protected character traits that Jus or her character 
IS recogmzable as taken from the plruntiff's character. Although Kurtz recogmzes that "the 
law does not possess the tools to distingUish great art from trash," Id. at 438, the test that 
she proposes for courts to determine copyright infrIngement of literary characters would, In 
fact, Involve the law In making such distinctions without the tools. DeCiding if a quality IS 
too "broad or stereotyped" and thus an unprotected Idea IS itself a Judgment about the 
worthiness of the character that has been created. 
222. See E. HIRSCH, supra note 89. 
223. E. HIRSCH, supra note 89, at 48-60. 
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As with works of the VISUal arts, another factor that affects a court's 
determination of where to draw the line between Idea and expressIOn In a 
gIven case InVOlVIng literary works IS the relative commercIal success of the 
works at Issue and the reputations of theIr creators. In Umversal City 
Studios, for example, the court mentioned the enormous success of Jaws 
and its commercIal value.224 These factors may have affected the court's 
declSlon finding so many aspects of the fIlm protectable. LikewIse, when 
one consIders the case agaInst SpIelberg's E. T.;ns the most successful fIlm 
of all time, one has to wonder whether Spielberg would not have had better 
luck swng the author of Lokey, if he had been the plamtiff claImIng that 
the play Infnnged his copynght In E. T The fact that the plaIntiff's play 
was not well-known226 and that the defendant's mOVIe was a commercIal 
blockbuster may very well have had some Impact on the court's willingness 
to grant defendant's motion for summary Judgment.227 
c. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy Unmasked 
LookIng back over the summary of the way the Idea-expressIon dichotomy 
has been applied to fictional literary works and works of the VISUal arts, 
one can make some general observations about the value of thIs pnncIple. 
In the context of both types of work, the critical determInatIOns for defining 
the line between protected and unprotected aspects of a gIven work are, 
first, the determInation of what IS the basIC Idea or subject matter and, 
then, a determInation of what aspects of the work are necessary or common 
ways of developIng that Idea and are thus unprotected. The determInation 
that a second work IS sImilar only In Idea and not In expreSSIon is thus 
easiest when the first artist or author has created a work that IS nch In 
224. 543 F SUpp. at 1136 (court found that the mOVIe had been exhibited "throughout the 
United States and the world to millions of members of the public"). Id. at 1139 ("The 
properties 'Jaws' and 'Jaws 2' have great value. Umversal has derived substantial revenue m 
the past from these properties, IS continumg to receIve substantial revenues now, and expects 
to continue receIvmg substantial revenues m the future from these properties."). 
225. Litchfield, 736 F.2d 1352. 
226. Id. at 1354. The trial court had found that "[djespite repeated efforts to find a receptive 
buyer for her works, plamtiff failed to find success m Hollywood." Id. 
227. The relative fame and success of a gIven work and the scol?e of its CIrculation, are, of 
course, relevant to the determmatIon of access. The more well-known the plamtiff's work IS, 
the more reasonable it IS to mfer that the defendant saw or had an opportunity to see that 
work. Compare, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 1984) (limited distribution of 
plamtiff's song a factor m finding no proof of access) with Abkco MUSIC Inc. v. Harnsongs 
MUSIC, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998 (2d Cir. 1983) (fact that plamtiff's song was a number one 
hit conSIdered as a factor m finding defendant's access to that song). 
These two factors should have no beanng, however, on the determmation of substantial 
SImilarity m WhIch the Issue IS whether so much expreSSIOn has been copIed that the defendant 
should be held liable for COPYrIght mfrmgement. See generally Cohen, supra note 92, at 735-
39. 
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particulanzed details that are not necessarily dictated by the basIC Idea or 
subject matter, and the second artist has not copIed those particulanzed 
details. Conversely, the determmation that expreSSIon has been copIed IS also 
eaSIest m those cases mvolvmg works nch m particulanzed details that are 
not necessarily dictated by the basIC Idea, if the second artist has, m fact, 
copIed those partIcularIzed details. 
In most cases, however, that determmatlon IS not sImple because there 
are no defined, objective critena for decIding whether a particular detail IS 
dictated by the subject matter or a common way of expressmg the basIC 
Idea and therefore unprotected. A reVIew of the cases has revealed that tills 
critical determmation IS little more than a determmation of what IS conSIdered 
meritonous m a gIven work, based on particular Judges' assessments of the 
artistic value of works, mcluding theIr assessment of the style, novelty and 
commerCIal value of those works and the reputation of theIr creators. ThIS 
assessment, m tum, IS a reflection of what a particular Judge knows about 
and values m such works. 
Thus, the determmation of the line between an Idea and its expreSSIon m 
a gIven work IS a determmation that reflects the values of the particular 
Judge who IS Judgmg the works at Issue. The line between an Idea and its 
expreSSIOn, and therefore the line between liability and non-liability for 
copyrIght mfrmgement, are thus lines drawn on the baSIS of assessments of 
artistIC value determmed by "persons tramed only to the law," the very 
thmg warned agamst by JustIce Holmes.228 
CONCLUSION 
We started with the assumptIon that it would be best if copyrIght deter-
mmatIOns, mcluding determmatIOns of mfrmgement, could be made without 
regard for the artIStIC value of the works at Issue. ThIS assumption was 
based on the VIew that determmatIOns of artIStIC merit mevitably reflect the 
subjective values and expenences of those who make them and that therefore 
there can be no objective determmations of artistic merit. Thus, if copynght 
determmatlons were made on such a baSIS, the eXIstence and value of a 
copynght would be dependent on the cultural values and backgrounds of 
the Judges who made these determmations. 
We then explamed how courts and Congress attempted to aVOId thIS 
problem by structunng copynght law m a way that mImmIzed the role that 
assessments of artIstic value would have. In the context of determmations 
of mfrmgement, courts have used the Idea-expressIon dichotomy m an 
attempt to prOVIde ·some objective framework. The doctnne that there IS a 
dichotomy between the protectable expreSSIon m a work and the unprotect-
228. See supra notes 55-90 and accompanymg text. 
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able Idea it expresses has its roots in the clasSICal VIew that artistic works 
reflect some uDlversal truths or transcendent essence that cannot and should 
not be captured or controlled by one artist. ConsIstent with thIs view, 
copynght law at one time protected only the particular form and format 
used by the artist to express his or her Ideas, and determInations of 
infnngement focused pnncipally on the Issue of independent creation. 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centunes, there has been a change m the 
prevailing VIew of the creative process. Romantic and post-Romantic VIews 
of art and literature no longer see the creation of art and literature as 
revealing or imitating uDlversal truths, but rather see it as a process that IS 
valued for what it tells us about the artist and the artist's perceptions of 
art. Thus, it IS no longer necessary or valuable or even possible to dissect a 
work of art to uncover the uDlversal truths or ideas which must remam 
freely available to all future authors.229 If people value instead that creative 
process itself, rather than a particular end product, as conceptual artists 
do,230 then copynght's focus on that end product seems mIsplaced. Every 
work of art, even if a copy of another's work, could be seen as valuable m 
the sense that it was unique to the particular artist who engaged m that 
process.231 To the extent that copynght law rests on the VIew that the 
government should prohibit copying of expreSSIon m order to protect the 
original artist but allow the copymg of Ideas m order to encourage the 
creation of new works, it may be missmg the pomt. There may be no way 
for the new artist to extract the "idea" without the "expreSSIon" of it, and 
moreover, there may be no pomt m makmg that artist attempt to do so 
because that artist's creation of hIs or her work may be conSIdered valuable 
as a reflection of that artist and that artist's definition of what IS art. 
For these reasons, the idea-expressIon dichotomy, conceptually grounded 
m clasSIcal and neoclasSIcal views of art that are no longer Widely accepted, 
IS doomed to fail. Courts have no philosophical or objective basIS on whIch 
to rely m trying to distingwsh the Ideas from the expreSSIOn m works of 
art. Thus, the Judge's assessment of the artistic value of the work, a SUbjective 
229. See Hughes, supra note 99. Hughes suggests that In a Lockean VIew of Intellectual 
property, "idea" and "expression" could be distinguIshed by VIeWing "expression" as that 
part of the process wluch Involves labor, gIven the Lockean VIew of property as based on 
labor. Hughes also recogruzes, however, that often people cannot separate the "idea" from 
the labor used to express or execute that Idea because the labor precedes or occurs Simulta-
neously with the development of the Idea itself. ld. at 310-12, 314. 
230. See supra note 125 and accompanymg text. 
231. See Bernstein, The Fake as More, In IDEA ART, supra note 125, at 41-45. Bernstein 
suggests that the art of painter Hank Herron, who produces "fake" paintings, that IS, exact 
reproductions of paintings by Frank Stella, has value for its philosoplucal statement about the 
derual of ongInality. See also Battin, Exact Replication In the Visual Arts, 38 J. AEsTHETICS 
& ART CRITICISM 153-58 (1979) (author describes the humarustic values of copYIng other works 
of art). 
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detenrunation that reflects the personal values and ,background of the judge, 
has filled the vacuum m mfnngement detenrunations. 
Since thIs subjectivity IS unavoIdable m the context of detenrumng m-
fnngement, the courts should not hIde behInd the seemmgly objective labels 
of Idea and expressIon. A straIghtforward and self-aware form of decIsIon-
makIng and opImon writing IS one necessary step m mmlIlllzmg the problems 
that are created when judges make copynght mfnngement deCISIons on the 
basIS of theIr assessments of the artistic merits of the works before them. 
